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Essays on International Capital Flows
Mengxue Wang
This dissertation consists of three essays on international capital flows. The first chapter
documents the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the simultaneous increase in the
foreign direct investment (FDI) for emerging market economies. The second chapter discusses
the performance of FDI firms and domestic firms in creating jobs using firm-level data from
Orbis. The third chapter studies the proper exchange rate and monetary policy when emerging
market economies denominate their external debt in foreign currencies.
In Chapter 1, I study why emerging market economies hold high levels of foreign exchange
reserves. I argue that foreign exchange reserves help emerging markets attract foreign direct
investment. This incentive can play an important role when analyzing central banks’ reserve
accumulation. I study the interaction between foreign exchange reserves and foreign direct
investment to explain the level of reserves using a small open economy model. The model puts
the domestic entities and international investors in the same picture. The optimal level of the
reserve-to-GDP ratio generated by the model is close to the level observed in East Asian
economies. Additionally, the model generates positive co-movement between technology growth
and the current account. This feature suggests that high technology growth corresponds to net
capital outflow, because of the outflow of foreign exchange reserves in attracting the inflow of
foreign direct investment, thus providing a rationale to the ‘allocation puzzle’ in cross-economy
comparisons. The model also generates positive co-movement between foreign exchange reserves
and foreign debt, thus relating to the puzzle of why economies borrow and save simultaneously.
In Chapter 2, joint work with Sakai Ando, we study whether FDI firms hire more employees
than domestic firms for each dollar of assets. Using the Orbis database and its ownership structure
information, we show that, in most economies, domestic firms tend to hire more employees per
asset than FDI firms. The result remains robust across individual industries in the case study of
the United Kingdom. The analysis shows that an ownership change itself (from domestic to
foreign or vice versa) does not have an immediate impact on the employment per asset. This
result suggests that different patterns of job creation seem to come from technological differences
rather than from different ownership structures.
In Chapter 3, I investigate how the devaluation of domestic currency imposes a contractionary
effect on small open economies who have a significant amount of debt denominated in foreign
currencies. Economists and policymakers express concern about the "Original Sin" situation in
which most of the economies in the world cannot use their domestic currencies to borrow abroad.
A devaluation will increase the foreign currency-denominated debt measured in the domestic
currency, which will lead to contractions in the domestic economy. However, previous literature
on currency denomination and exchange rate policy predicted limited or no contractionary effect
of devaluation. In this paper, I present a new model to capture this contractionary devaluation
effect with non-financial firms having foreign currency-denominated liabilities and domestic
currency-denominated assets. When firms borrow from abroad and keep part of the asset in
domestic cash or cash equivalents, the contractionary devaluation effect is exacerbated. The
model can be used to discuss the performance of the economy in interest under exchange rate
shocks and interest rate shocks. Future directions for empirically assessing the model and current
literature are suggested. This assessment will thus provide policy guidance for economies with
different levels of debt, especially foreign currency-denominated debt.
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Chapter 1: Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Reserves Accumulation
1.1 Introduction
In recent decades, there has been rapid growth in foreign exchange reserves (RX)1 held by emerg-
ing market (EM) economies. The average level of foreign exchange reserves for EM economies
has increased from below 10% of GDP in the 1980s to more than 20% of GDP in recent years.
The widely accepted traditional motives for reserve accumulation are to cushion exchange rate
volatility and prevent extreme events, for example, the 1994 Mexico peso crisis and the 1997
Asian Crisis. These motives have been explored in multiple strands of literature, for instance,
Jeanne and Rancière (2008) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2009). However, although the
literature finds that reserves help stabilize the exchange rate and reduce the probability of a crisis,
the general conclusion is that certain economies, such as the East Asian economies, hold excessive
RX. In other words, based on the existing traditional motives, the probability of a crisis needs to be
unrealistically high to justify the reserve level observed in some economies. Because reserve assets
are liquid and pay low returns, holding reserves incurs a substantial opportunity cost. Whether we
can explain the large accumulation of foreign reserves for some economies remains a puzzle.
In this paper, I study a novel channel to rationalize the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves
and discuss the macroeconomic implications. My argument is based on the idea that reserves can
reduce an economys perceived risk among foreign investors and thus have first-order effects in
attracting foreign investment, specifically in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). In other
words, both foreign investors and recipient economies know that reserves can serve as a buffer
against a currency crisis or exchange rate movement. Provided that foreign investors have limited
information on private firms in EM economies, which is common for EM economies with under-
1Foreign exchange reserves refer to cash or cash equivalents, liquid assets held by economies’ central banks, mostly
denominated in USD or EURO.
1
developed financial markets and less transparent regulations, reserves can be a tool that central
banks can employ to send positive signals to foreign investors and thus impact the latters invest-
ment decisions. Central banks choose to place domestic resources in low-yield assets and attract
external investment because they value the productivity gain provided by foreign investors, which
is a commonly discussed feature of FDI.
I first present a set of stylized facts regarding the relationships connecting reserves and FDI. I
show that reserve assets and FDI liabilities have both increased tremendously for EM economies
in recent decades. Reserve assets have grown to be the most significant component of the external
asset position of EM economies, and FDI liabilities have risen to be the most significant component
of their external liability position. There are robust positive correlations between reserves and FDI
across different measures.
I then build a small open economy model to specifically study the incentive of holding reserves
to attract FDI inflow in explaining the level of foreign exchange reserves. The model features a
two-way interaction between domestic recipient firms seeking foreign investment and foreign in-
vestors seeking yield. Since foreign investors do not have complete information on the recipient
economies, they expect a high level of reserves to reduce the volatility of the risk of the economy,
which I show is present in the data by using reserve levels and stock returns. The inflow of foreign
investment contributes to a higher level of domestic productivity. The information conveyed by the
reserve assets to foreign investors and the benefits of foreign investment provide central banks in-
centives to allocate a large amount of domestic resources to reserve assets. I calibrate the model to
the average level of EM economies and show that the optimal reserves generated by this incentive
can be more than 20% of GDP, suggesting that this incentive can make up for the gap between the
reality and the optimal level of reserves reported in the previous literature.
Another key feature of this mechanism described in this paper is that it can speak to an interna-
tional macroeconomics puzzle called the ‘allocation puzzle’ identified by Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013). The allocation puzzle refers to the empirical observation of a negative correlation between
the net flow of capital into countries and the technology growth of economies. Economies with
2
higher average technology growth over the 1980-2000 period experienced lower average net cap-
ital inflows, which contradicts the standard neoclassic growth model. However, this phenomenon
can be explained by the incentive for accumulating reserve assets and attracting foreign investment.
Given a technology improvement, there is indeed larger capital inflows into an economy for the
purpose of accumulating capital stock. However, there is simultaneously an outflow coming from
the accumulation of reserve assets to encourage more private capital inflow. The public capital
outflow and private capital inflow yield a net negative correlation between net capital inflow and
technology growth. This is also observed in the data if I decompose the capital flows into FDI
inflow and reserve outflow. The key mechanism in the model can generate the same pattern as
cited in the allocation puzzle, both at the aggregate level and after decomposing the capital flows.
In the following sections of the chapter, I first review the status quo of the research on foreign
reserves and FDI in section 1.2. Then, I present empirical motivations for this work in section 1.3,
where I examine the relationships between foreign reserves and FDI in the data. Next, I present
the model in section 1.4 and provide evidence for the model’s key mechanism. The calibration of
the model is explained in section 1.5. The equilibrium level of reserves and its relationship with
the key mechanism in the model are discussed in section 1.6. Section 1.7 provides the dynamics
generated by the model following shocks. Section 1.8 discusses the allocation puzzle in detail
by comparing the pattern generated in the model and the pattern in the data. Finally, section 1.9
discusses the general business cycle moments of the model.
1.2 Literature review
This paper mainly relates to the strands of literature on foreign exchange reserves, FDI, and the
correlations between capital flows in open economies. I will briefly summarize each strand of
research and discuss their connections with this paper.
The literature on foreign reserves has focused on the precautionary saving motive, reducing the
probability of a currency crisis and a capital flow crisis and stabilizing the exchange rate. Re-
ducing the probability of a crisis and precautionary saving are often intertwined and examined
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jointly in the literature. Frankel and Saravelos (2010) claim that reserve accumulation and past
movements in the real exchange rate were the two leading indicators of the varying incidence of
the Global Financial Crisis. Adopting a broader focus, Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) use panel
analysis across countries and across time to conclude that higher foreign reserves are associated
with a reduced probability of crisis in EMs. Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2009) documents
that having reserves in excess of predicted levels is associated with smaller subsequent nominal
exchange rate depreciation after 2008. Jeanne and Rancière (2008) uses a model to discuss the
optimal level of international reserves for a small open economy that is vulnerable to sudden stops
in capital flows. Reserves allow a country to smooth domestic absorption in response to sudden
stops. They conclude that existing theory can explain the level of reserves observed in many coun-
tries, but the trend of accumulating reserves observed in EM economies appears excessive. The
purpose of my paper is to propose a new explanation of holding reserves for EM economies, in an
effort to reconcile the optimal reserve level predicted by theory and that observed in the data, and
simultaneously explain other patterns of capital flows in the data.
Another strand of literature focuses on the question of why countries save through reserves while
simultaneously accumulating external debt. Although previous works argue that high levels of
reserve reduce the risk of crisis, EM economies can naturally avoid the risk of potential sudden
stops and insolvent situations by reducing the level of debt instead of holding reserves. Alfaro and
Kanczuk (2009) constructs a model in which both debt and reserves are imperfect substitutes to
shift resources from repayment states to default states. However, the optimal strategy in that model
is not to hold reserves at all. Bianchi, Hatchondo and Martinez (2018) add borrowing through
long-term debt to the former model. In this setup, the country has incentives to borrow when the
borrowing cost is low and deleverage when the borrowing cost is high. In my model, I show that
without resorting to long-maturity debt, there is co-movement between external debt and reserves.
The central bank has the incentive to finance the accumulation of reserves through high-spread
external debt because of the reserves’ impact on private capital flows.
The paper further relates to the literature on reserves and exchange rate volatility. The signaling
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effect of reserves in reducing investment risk in EM economies can work through stabilizing the
exchange rate, which leads to less volatile returns. There is vast literature suggesting that reserves
stabilize the exchange rate. Nowak, Hviding and Ricci (2004) study the role of an increase in
foreign exchange reserves in reducing currency volatility for EM countries. Their results provide
support for the proposition that holding adequate reserves reduces exchange rate volatility. The
effect is nonlinear and appears to operate through a signaling effect. Cady and Gonzalez-Garcia
(2007) find that reserve adequacy is significant in determining exchange rate volatility for both
EM and industrialized countries. Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2008) observe that international
reserves cushion the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on the real exchange rate and that this effect
is essential for developing but not for industrialized countries. Eichler and Littke (2018) find that
country pairs with higher levels of foreign exchange reserves exhibit less exchange rate volatility.
This paper relates to the FDI literature by addressing one of the main characteristics studied by
that literature: FDI increases the productivity of recipient countries. Aitken and Harrison (1999)
finds that foreign equity participation is positively correlated with plant productivity for small
enterprises. There is a productivity gain from foreign ownership but the little spillover effect.
Blonigen and Wang (2004) and Melitz, Helpman and Yeaple (2004) find that export platform FDI
may have a potentially larger effect on growth. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) study US
multinationals operating in the EU in sectors that intensively use information technology (IT).
These sectors in the EU experienced the same level of productivity growth as the US. In general,
the literature has observed an increase in productivity from FDI due to the transfer of the investors’
technology to the firms of the recipient economies.
There is little literature on the interaction of FDI and RX.Matsumoto (2018) builds on Benigno and
Fornaro (2012) in modeling that accumulating reserves depreciates the real exchange rate, which
leads to a shift in domestic production to the tradable sector. This will attract FDI into the tradable
sector, which leads to higher productivity gains. My paper does not rely on the distinction between
the tradable and non-tradable sectors and focuses more on the signaling gain due to reserves with-
out relating it to the first-order effect of devaluating the exchange rate. I isolate the channel of the
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potential second-order effect by stabilizing the return on investment for foreign investors through
reserve accumulation. Huang (2018) discusses the joint impact of a high level of reserves and a
high level of FDI stock in China from the perspective of the investment return of the country. He
gathered data from top banks in China and stock market information to calculate the market value
of reserve assets and FDI liability. He then showed that the return on equity in China is higher
than the return from reserve asset investment. My paper argues that reserves do not serve as an
investment device but rather as a signaling device.
This paper also speaks to the research on capital flows of EMs, mainly the ‘allocation puzzle’, and
can provide an explanation for that puzzle based on the main mechanism of the model. Gourin-
chas and Jeanne (2013) discuss the phenomenon of a negative correlation between the net flow of
capital into an economy and its technology growth, which they call the ‘allocation puzzle’. Al-
faro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2014) further documents the public and private flows and
demonstrates that sovereigntosovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global
imbalances. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004) describes how international reserves can
be interpreted as a form of collateral for FDI flows to less developed economies. This causes the
outflow of capital for EMs in the form of reserve assets and the inflow of capital in the form of
FDI liability, which is called the ‘Bretton Woods 2’ system. The Bretton Wood 2 system is not
quantified and is based only on the rough description of potential channels. However, it can be
falsified by decomposing the reserve assets flowing into a certain economy and the FDI liabilities
coming from a certain economy to see if they match each other proportionally, that is, whether the
economies that receive larger reserve inflows provide more FDI. My paper differs from the Bretton
Woods 2 concept in that it does not impose the insurance role of reserve assets but models reserves
as a coordinating device for both investors and recipient economies and provides evidence for this
mechanism. The signals do not work by directly providing collateral to a certain economy but gen-
erally indicate the economic conditions of the recipient country. Aguiar and Amador (2011) adopts
a political economy setup that can also speak to the allocation puzzle in which there is a limited
commitment from the governments’ debt. Foreign investors would only let capital flow to coun-
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tries with lower debt levels. Since political parties prefer spending to occur when they are in office
to reduce the chance of losing their positions, there is a trade-off between borrowing to consume
today and paying off external debt to let capital flow into the country and allow higher consump-
tion in the future. This gives rise to the phenomenon whereby economies that grow rapidly tend to
increase their net foreign asset position to encourage other forms of capital inflow. Thus, there is a
net reduction in public debt combined with an inflow of private capital in fast-growing economies
and the reverse in shrinking economies. My paper differs in that an increased net asset position
means higher reserve accumulation instead of a lower debt level. Borrowing is used to accumulate
reserves to encourage more FDI instead of more consumption.
1.3 Empirical analysis
In this section, I will show some empirical evidence on the status quo of the levels of reserves and
levels of FDI liabilities for emerging market economies. I will also put the two capital flows in the
same pictures and show the connections between the two.
1.3.1 Aggregate trend of reserves and FDI
The amount of foreign reserves held by EM economies has grown in the past 30 years. Figure 1.1
shows the average reserves-to-GDP ratio2 for EM economies and advanced economies over the
period 1980-2017. The average reserves-to-GDP ratio for EM economies tripled in recent decades,
from below 0.1 in the early 1980s to more than 0.2 in recent years. The ratio has remained relatively
stable for advanced economies, with an average of approximately 0.1-0.15 in recent years.
Another indicator that reveals the adequacy of EM economies’ reserves is the short-term-debt-to-
reserves ratio. Although policymakers have long discussed the optimal amount of reserves that
EM economies should hold, there is no consensus on this question. The IMF has rule-of-thumb
guidelines for reserve holdings according to which a country should hold foreign reserves in an
amount equal to their short-term debt liability. This rule can ensure that the economies are able
2The average for 33 EM economies and 47 advanced economies. The full set of countries is listed in the appendix
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Figure 1.1: Reserves-to-GDP ratio, average for advanced economies and EM economies



























Note: This figure plots the average reserves-to-GDP ratio for 33 EM economies and 47 advanced
economies from 1980 to 2017
Source: World Bank WDI
to repay their short-term debt and avoid insolvency when facing sudden stops in financing. These
sudden stops refer to periods when economies are not able to secure capital inflow or roll over
debt. However, the amount of reserves held by EM economies has far exceeded their short-term
debt. Their average level of reserves is nearly four times that of their total short-term external debt.
Figure 1.2 plots the average short-term debt-to-reserves ratio for EM economies. A value greater
than one indicates that the short-term debt exceeds the amount of reserves, while a value smaller
than one value indicates the opposite. Short-term debt exceeded reserves before 2000. By contrast,
reserves have exceeded short-term debt for the past ten years, and the ratio suggests that the amount
of reserves is three times that of short-term debt.
As reserves have grown to become a large proportion of the assets of EM economies, FDI has be-
come their most significant form of liability. Figure 1.3 plots the components of the gross liability
and gross asset positions of EM economies in recent decades. The positive y-axis plots the decom-
position of the gross asset position. It has been growing in size since the late 1990s. Meanwhile,
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Figure 1.2: Short-term-debt-to-reserves ratio, average for all EM economies




























Note: This figure plots the average short-term debt as a percentage of foreign reserves for EM
economies from 1980 to 2017.
Source: World Bank WDI
reserve assets have taken up an increasing share of the gross asset position, suggesting that EM
economies mainly save through reserves. The negative y-axis plots the decomposition of the total
liability position, of which FDI liability is the major component. FDI has in conjunction with the
size of the liability of EM economies and has constituted half of their external liability in recent
years. This suggests that FDI inflow has been the main form of capital inflow into EM economies.
This graph indicates that as these economies gradually build up their balance sheets, both reserves
and FDI have become significant parts. When analyzing the behavior of capital inflows and out-
flows of EM economies, it is important to closely examine to the most significant asset (reserves)
and the most significant liability (FDI).
1.3.2 Correlation between foreign exchange reserves and FDI
Having examined the trends in the RX and FDI series in recent decades, I can put them in a single
analysis and explore the interactions between them. A positive correlation between reserves and
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Figure 1.3: Asset and liability decomposition of emerging market economies
International Investment Position of EM economies, Bil$ adjusted for CPI
















Note: This figure plots the gross asset and gross liability decomposition for EM economies.
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
FDI can be established through different specifications and definitions of variables. This relation-
ship is robust across all analyses. The five different specifications showing the positive correlation
between FDI and reserves are summarized below.
Co-movement of reserves and FDI inflow in major EM economies
Figure 1.4 plots the co-movement of the reserves-to-GDP ratio3 and FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio for
six major EM economies. These economies have high levels of the reserves-to-GDP ratio, ranging
from 20% to 50% in recent years. The inflow of FDI in each year is also substantial, ranging from
0.5% to 10% of GDP. Within each economy, the periods with a high reserves-to-GDP ratio are also
the periods with a high FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio.
3Unless otherwise stated, all the empirical analyses take the reserves-to-GDP ratio to be the lagged reserves divided
by current GDP.
10




























































































Note: This figure plots the reserve-to-GDP ratio and FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio for six major EM
economies.
Source: IMF IFS and World Bank WDI
Cross-economy and cross-time analysis of the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio and reserve-to-GDP
ratio
I can apply this analysis to a broader set of economies by examining the correlation between the
reserves-to-GDP ratio and FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio across economies and years. Figure 1.5 plots
the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio on the y-axis and the reserves-to-GDP-ratio on the x-axis for all EM
economies in the sample. Each dot represents a country-year combination. The figure suggests
a robust positive correlation between the two variables; across economies and over time, higher
savings in foreign reserves correspond to higher ‘borrowing’ in FDI.
There are analyses in other dimensions to show the positive correlation between to two variables,
for example, the economies with larger changes in reserves asset position correspond to the ones
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Figure 1.5: Positive correlation between FDI stock and reserves





















Note: This scatter plot shows the reserves-to-GDP ratio and FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio for 33 EM
economies for the period 1980-2017. Each dot represents a economy-year combination
Source: IMF IFS and World Bank WDI
with larger changes in FDI liability position. They are included in the Appendix A.1.2 for further
reference.
Strong positive correlation between RX/GDP and FDI/GDP
This positive correlation between FDI and reserves can be further illustrated with a reduced-form
regression by specifying the following model:
퐹퐷퐼푖푡
퐺퐷푃푖푡
= 훽1 + 훽2 푅푋푖푡−1
퐺퐷푃푖푡
+ 푎푡 + 푐푖 + 푢푖푡
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Table 1.1 reports the results of regressing the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio on the one-period-lagged
reserves-to-GDP ratio. The four specifications correspond to no fixed effects, time fixed effects,
economy fixed effects and both fixed effects. The table suggests that across all specifications,
the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio and reserves-to-GDP ratio have strong positive correlations. A 1 unit
increase in the reserves-to-GDP ratio correlates significantly with a 0.4-1 unit increase in the FDI-
stock-to-GDP ratio, depending on the specification.
Table 1.2 reports the corresponding analysis by taking the FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio as the de-
pendent variable in the empirical specification. A 1 unit increase in the reserves-to-GDP ratio
correlates significantly with a 0.02-0.076 unit increase in the FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio. These
observations will also be discussed later in the model calibration part of the paper.
As robustness checks, other factors that are commonly considered to be determinants of FDI lia-
bilities are included in the regression equation. The full set of results is reported in the Appendix
A.1.3. The results suggest that this positive correlation is robust to the inclusion other control
variables. I also include one empirical specification in which the dependent variable is changed to
the FDI-stock-to-total-liability ratio. The positive and significant correlation suggests that a high
level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio also correlates with a high FDI liability as a percentage of total
liability, suggesting that a larger fraction of the ‘borrowing’ of the economy is in the form of FDI.
Table 1.1: Regression of FDI stock/GDP on Reserves/GDP
Dependent variable: FDI stock/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Res푖푡−1/퐺퐷푃푖푡 0.552∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.033) (0.100) (0.056)
Time fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Country fixed effect No No Yes Yes
Observations 618 618 618 618
R2-Standard 0.144 0.292 0.695 0.834
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the economy and time levels ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 1.2: Regression of FDI inflow/GDP on Reserves/GDP
Dependent variable: FDI inflow/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Res푖푡−1/퐺퐷푃푖푡 0.076∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009)
Time fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Country fixed effect No No Yes Yes
Observations 998 998 998 998
R2-Standard 0.101 0.221 0.384 0.487
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country and time levels ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All empirical investigations consistently suggest positive co-movement between the level of FDI
stock/inflow and the level of reserves. This positive correlation is the feature that will be built into
the model to explain the high level of reserves held by EM economies.
1.4 The model
1.4.1 Households
The economy is assumed to be populated by a large representative family with a continuum of
members. Consumption is identical across family members. Household preferences are defined





where 훽 ∈ (0, 1) represents a subjective discount factor, and푈 is a period utility index assumed to
be strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Households have access to a bond issued by central bank, 푏퐻푡 , which pays the gross interest rate
푅퐻푡−1 when held from 푡−1 to 푡. The household can hold positive or negative quantities of this bond.
When the quantity is positive, the household is lending to the central bank. When the quantity is
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negative, the household is borrowing from the central bank. The household also receives dividends
from the ownership of producing firms, denoted Π푡 . The household’s period-by-period budget
constraint is given by:
푐푡 + 푏퐻푡 = 푅퐻푡−1푏퐻푡−1 + Π푡 (1.2)
Households take 푅퐻푡 and Π푡 as given. In the model, households do not have access to the interna-
tional financial market, and their only access to borrowing and saving is through 푏퐻푡 .
The household chooses processes for 푐푡 and 푏퐻푡 to maximize the utility function (1.1) subject to




훽푡{푈 (푐푡)) + 휆1푑푡 (푅퐻푡−1푏퐻푡−1 + Π푡 − 푐푡 − 푏퐻푡 )}
where 휆1푑푡 represent the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (1.2). The first-order conditions with
respect to 푐푡 and 푏퐻푡 are,respectively, given by
푈′(푐푡) − 휆1푑푡 = 0 (1.3)
휆1푑푡 = 훽퐸푡{휆1푑푡+1푅퐻푡 } (1.4)
1.4.2 Firms
The economy is also populated by a representative firm that makes investment and production




where 퐴푡 is an exogenous technology process, 푘푡 denotes physical capital and the parameter 훼 ∈
(0, 1). Capital depreciates at rate 훿 and firms will invest to build capital for the next period, so that
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푘푡+1 = (1 − 훿)푘푡 + 푖푡 (1.6)
where 푖푡 denotes investment.
Firms need to decide whether to finance the investment through equity, which is FDI 푖퐹푡 , or debt,




푡 . The investment
aggregator 퐹 (푖퐻푡 , 푖퐹푡 ) is increasing and concave in both elements.
푖푡 = 퐹 (푖퐻푡 , 푖퐹푡 ) (1.7)
If the firm uses domestic investment, it needs to borrow from the central bank at an interest rate
푅푖푡 and will need to repay the principal and interest in the next period. If the firm uses foreign
investment 푖퐹푡 , it correspondingly needs to sell a new share
푖퐹푡
푘푡+1 to foreign investors and repay a
share of the profit to foreign investors in the next period. The total share of the firm 푥푡 owned by
foreign investors also depreciates at rate 훿, the depreciation rate of capital. The evolution of the
shares held by foreign investors is thus given by





To capture the advantage of using FDI 푖퐹푡 over domestic investment 푖
퐻
푡 , the productivity 퐴푡 is
modeled as an increasing function of the existing FDI inflow from last period 푖퐹푡−1




where 퐴1 is a parameter and 퐴2푡 and 퐴
3
푡 are two exogenous processes. 푖
퐹
푠푠 refers to the steady-state
level of foreign investment. The firm also pays a proportional tax on its foreign investment 푖퐹푡 in
each period at rate 휏푡 and receives a lump-sum transfer from the government 푇푡
Under these assumptions, the profit of the firm after paying dividends to the foreign investors in
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period 푡 is given by
Π푡 = (1 − 푥푡−1) (퐴푡푘훼푡 ) − 푅푖푡−1푖퐻푡−1 + 푇푡 − 휏푡푖퐹푡 (1.10)
where the firm pays dividends to the foreign investors 푥푡−1퐴푡푘훼푡 , repays the debt 푅푖푡−1푖
퐻
푡−1 from
borrowing from the central bank in the previous period 푡 − 1, is subject to a tax/transfer 푇푡 from the
government and pays a proportional tax for inducing foreign investment 휏푡푖퐹푡 .
The firm thus chooses processes for 푘푡+1, 푖푡 , 푥푡 , 푖퐻푡 , 푖퐹푡 to maximize the present discounted value of
dividends, subject to equations (1.6)−(1.9), replaces 퐴푡 with equation (1.9), and takes 휏푡 , 푇푡 , 푅푖푡 as
given.





(1 − 푥푡−1)퐴푡푘훼푡 − 푅푖푡−1푖퐻푡−1 + 푇푡 − 휏푡푖퐹푡
)
where 푀0,푡 is the stochastic discount factor between time 0 and t for firms. Since the profit is










(1 − 푥푡−1)퐴푡푘훼푡 − 푅푖푡−1푖퐻푡−1 + 푇푡 − 휏푡푖퐹푡 +






where 휆2푑푡 −휆4푑푡 corresponds to the Lagrangian multipliers of equations (1.6) - (1.8), with equation




푀0,푡 (휆2푑푡 − 휆3푑푡 ) = 0 (1.11)
퐸푡{푀0,푡+1(1 − 푥푡)퐴푡+1푘훼−1푡+1 훼 + 푀0,푡+1휆2푑푡+1(1 − 훿) − 푀0,푡휆2푑푡 − 푀0,푡휆4푑푡
푖퐹푡
푘2푡+1
} = 0 (1.12)
퐸푡{−푀0,푡+1퐴푡+1푘훼푡+1 + 푀0,푡+1(1 − 훿)휆4푑푡+1} = 휆4푑푡 푀0,푡 (1.13)
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퐸푡{푀0,푡+1푅푖푡} = 푀0,푡휆3푑푡 퐹푖퐻푡 (1.14)
퐸푡{푀0,푡+1(1 − 푥푡) 휕퐴푡+1
휕푖퐹푡
푘훼푡+1} + 푀0,푡휆3푑푡 퐹푖퐹푡 + 푀0,푡휆4푑푡
1
푘푡+1
− 푀0,푡휏푡 = 0 (1.15)
1.4.3 Central bank and government
The central bank makes decisions on the interest rate of lending/borrowing from the households
푅퐻푡 and the interest rate of lending to firms 푅
푖
푡 . The central bank’s budget constraint is given by the
following equation
푏퐻푡 − 푏퐻푡−1푅퐻푡−1︸            ︷︷            ︸
Household
− (푖퐻푡 − 푖퐻푡−1푅푖푡−1)︸            ︷︷            ︸
Firms
= 푟푥푡 − 푟푥푡−1푅푟푡−1︸             ︷︷             ︸
Reserves
− (푏퐹푡 − 푏퐹푡−1푅 푓푡−1)︸              ︷︷              ︸
External Debt
(1.16)
The interest rate on reserves 푅푟푡 and the interest rate on foreign debt 푅
푓
푡 follow two exogenous
processes.
The central bank can choose to finance the accumulation of foreign reserves 푟푥푡 through foreign
debt 푏퐹푡 or by suppressing domestic consumption by borrowing from households 푏
퐻
푡 . This is the
cost of holding foreign reserves for EM economies in the model. The economy will experience
temporary loss in consumption or borrow from the rest of the world at a higher interest rate than
the safe interest rate paid on holding foreign reserves.




푡 = 푇푡 (1.17)
1.4.4 Foreign investors
Foreign investors are the shareholders in domestic firms because they invest in the firms through
FDI inflow 푖퐹푡 and obtain a share of the firm’s output in the subsequent periods. An investor decides
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in every period how much to invest in the firms. Foreign investors do not have perfect information
on the economic conditions of the recipient EM economies. According to the investors’ beliefs,
the level of reserves 푟푥푡 affects the volatility of the return on their investment.4. This is the key
assumption in the model: the expected volatility of the return on FDI is a decreasing function of
the level of reserves. Some empirical evidence on this assumption will be provided in the next
section.
Let us assume that foreign investors face two choices of assets in each period. One is the risky
asset FDI 푖퐹푡 , which foreign investors believe will pay a stochastic return, and the volatility of which
depends on the level of reserves. The other is a global safe asset that always pays a constant interest
rate. Then, this is an infinite-horizon portfolio allocation problem between risky and riskless assets.
Allow me to deviate from the main setup of the investors’ problem by assuming for the present
that the FDI asset is a one-period risky asset for the foreign investors to characterize the problem
and provide the explicit solution of the investors’ demand for FDI.
Suppose that a foreign investor at the beginning of every period has wealth 푊푡 ; he or she needs
to decide how much to consume and how much to invest in a risky asset, which is FDI in EM
economies, or a risk-free asset. Let 푅1 denote the gross return on the risk-free asset. Let퐺
푓
푡 denote
the gross risky return on the FDI asset. Investors expect 푙푛퐺 푓푡 to follow a normal distribution
푁 (푑푡 , 휎2푡 ). The utility function of the investors follows a constant relative risk aversion utility
function with 훾 being the risk-aversion parameter. 푎푡 represents the share of wealth that investors
invest in the risky FDI asset. The budget constraint and maximization function of the foreign




푊푡+1 = 푎푡 (푊푡 − 퐶푡)퐺 푓푡+1 + (1 − 푎푡) (푊푡 − 퐶푡)푅1
4A simple micro-foundation of this belief is provided in the Appendix
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Here, I follow the same setup as the Merton-Samuelson discrete-time portfolio allocation model. I
obtain the solution that 퐶푖푡 is a constant fraction of푊푡 , b푊푡 . 푎푡 is an explicit function of the other




푡+1 − 푅1 + 휎푡+12
훾휎푡+1
The share of wealth that the investors will invest in the risky FDI asset depends on two key factors.
The first is the spread between the expected return and the safe asset. The second is the volatility
of the demand for the FDI investment under the assumption that FDI is a one-period asset:
푖퐹푡 = 푎푡 (푊푡 − 퐶푡) = (1 − 푏)푊푡
퐸푡퐺
푓
푡+1 − 푅1 + 휎푡+12
훾휎푡+1
However, it is unrealistic to assume that the FDI asset only pays a one-period return. To keep the
model tractable and incorporate the features of FDI, I take the functional form from the single-
period payment case and apply it to the multi-period payment of FDI, which yields the following
investment decision for the foreign investors:








where 휎푡+1 explicitly takes the form of 푟푥−휁 , which is a decreasing function of the level of reserves.
푊푡 represents the wealth of the foreign investors. 퐺
푓
푡+1 represents the return on the asset. 훾 is the
risk aversion of the investors in their power utility function
The share owned by the investors for the newly invested 푖퐹푡 in the firm is defined as
푖퐹푡
푘푡+1 . This share
will remain in the recipient firm. Investors can obtain a series of returns for every period in the




푘푡+1 times the output of the firm 퐴푡+1푘
훼
푡+1 from the next period, and the resale value
takes into account the devaluation in the next period 푝푖푡+1(1 − 훿) over the investment made in this
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period 푖퐹푡 . Thus, the expected return on FDI asset 퐺
푓
푡+1 is characterized as follows:










The price for the firm is the production in next period plus the discounted price of next period.
푝푖푡 = 퐸푡 (퐴푡+1푘훼푡+1 + 훽푖푝푖푡+1) (1.20)
where 훽푖 represents the discount factor for foreign investors and is endogenously given. The evo-
lution of the wealth of investors is given by
푊푡+1 = (1 − 푏)푊푡 − 푖퐹푡 + 푥푡−1퐴푡푘훼푡 (1.21)
1.4.5 What is FDI?
The setup in the model of modeling FDI liability is obviously a reduced form of modeling of the
real activities related to FDI. However, I argue that this modeling captures the critical features of
FDI that are of interest in this paper and its relationship linking foreign and domestic entities. I
also attempt to evaluate the effect of this simplification on the main mechanism that I capture in
the model.
The model simplifies the forms of private inflow into domestic firms. FDI is, in reality, defined
as foreign residents owning more than 10% (voting power) of domestic firms, both directly and
indirectly. Firms can take on foreign investment through portfolio investment in the form of an
equity acquisition of less than 10% and through private debt flow. In the model, FDI is modeled as a
foreign investment in the domestic firm via equity acquisition. The private inflow is also simplified
to consist only of FDI inflow, not other equity inflows or debt instruments. This simplification is
a fair representation of private inflows into EM economies in recent years. Most of the private
investment in EM economies is through a direct investment relationship. I use the data from
IFS to demonstrate that FDI is indeed the main form of private capital inflow into firms. IFS
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has decomposed the net international liability position of the economies into Direct investment,
Portfolio investment and Other investment. Under Portfolio investment and Other investment,
there are three subcategories of private corporations’ liabilities. I calculate the share of the direct
investment over the sum of direct investment and these three other corporate liability categories.
The results suggest that FDI liability has increased to approximately 85% of total liabilities in
recent years. This justifies my modeling choice of only including FDI liabilities for the firms.
The model also differs from the actual accounting value of FDI stocks and inflows. Based on IMF
standard BPM6 and OECD standard BMD4, the recommendation for reporting FDI statistics, both
stocks and flows, is that they be based on market value. However, it is challenging to produce
market values of FDI positions because the equity of many direct investment enterprises is not
listed. Often, the only information available to compilers is the book value available on either the
books of the direct investor or the target enterprise. Thus, if market values are unavailable, FDI
data at book value should be adjusted or imputed to estimate the market value. The main purpose
of using market value is to enable the comparison of different forms of accounting items for the
economy/firms. Due to the complexity of market value accounting and the irrelevancy of using
market value to the main mechanism of the model, I do not use the market value of the firms to
represent FDI inflows and stocks.
The FDI inflow into the model economy is defined as 푖퐹푡 , or the inflow of foreign investment, which
is in the unit of domestic and foreign consumption goods. Since the units of reserves and foreign
debts in terms of consumption goods are also one, one can compare the current account component
of the economy, including the reserve flow, the debt flow and the FDI flow in the model.
The FDI stock in the model is defined as the claim on the firm’s capital instead of the claim on the
market value of the firm. This is to simplify the net investment position of domestic firms. Given
the definition of FDI inflow in the model, the claim on domestic capital enables us to decompose
the change in investment position from the change in foreign-owned FDI stock into the new inflow
푖퐹푡 and the depreciation of the claim −훿푥푡−1푘푡+1, such that one would have (푥푡 − 푥푡−1)푘푡+1 = 푖푡 −
훿푥푡−1푘푡+1, which is precisely equation (1.8).
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These deviations from the standard accounting of FDI do not jeopardize our main channel and the
correlation analysis between different forms of capital flows.
These deviations from the standard accounting for FDI do not jeopardize our main channel or the
correlation analysis between different forms of capital flows.
There are several features of FDI that the model captures and are critical for the mechanism in
the model. The first is that the inflow of FDI is influenced by the reserve level. This is to capture
the advantages of foreign investment over domestic investment. The second feature is the equity
payment of the FDI investment. This is to capture the riskiness of FDI, namely, that the return
on FDI depends on the return on capital and the unknown production within the economy. The
feature of the risky return contributes to explaining why, in reality, the investors care about the
stability of the country and why, in the model, the reserve serves as a signaling device. The third
feature captured by the model is that FDI pays multi-period returns, which ensures that there will
be a reasonable measure of the FDI stock in the economy. There are obviously other features pf
FDI and reserves in reality that are not captured by the model. However, they are not central to our
analysis, and adding them would complicate the model without offering further insights.
1.4.6 Competitive equilibrium
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of stationary processes 푐푡 , 푦푡 , 푏퐻푡 , Π푡 , 푘푡+1, 푥푡 , 푖퐻푡 , 푖퐹푡 ,














푡 , 푟푥푡 , 푏
퐹
푡 , and 푇푡 that satisfies equations (1.2)-(1.17),
given a central bank policy on 푅푖푡 and 푅
퐻
푡 , 휏푡 , exogenous stochastic processes on technology 퐴
2
푡 ,





1.4.7 The social planner
Let us solve the benevolent social planners’ problem in choosing the stochastic processes 푐푡 , 푟푥푡 ,





subject to the constraints
푖퐻푡 + 푐푡 + 푟푥푡 − 푟푥푡−1푅푟푡−1 = (1 − 푥푡−1)퐴푡 (푖퐹푡−1)푘훼푡 + 푏퐹푡 − 푏퐹푡−1푅 푓푡−1 (1.22)
푘푡+1 = (1 − 훿)푘푡 + 푖푡 (1.23)
푖푡 = 퐹 (푖퐻푡 , 푖퐹푡 ) (1.24)











Equation (1.22) is the aggregate economy-wide resource constraint. The output of the economy,
after the dividend payment to foreign investors, is used to consume 푐푡 , invest 푖퐻푡 , accumulate/de-
cumulate foreign reserves 푟푥푡 and accumulate/decumulate external debt 푏퐹푡 . It is the combination
of household budget constraint equation (1.2), central bank budget constraint equation (1.16), gov-
ernment budget constraint (1.17) and the definition of profit Π푡 equation (1.10).








푡 correspond to the Lagrangian multipliers of the above five constraints




훽푡퐸0{푈 (푐푡) + 휆1푡
((1 − 푥푡−1)퐴푡푘훼푡 + 푏퐹푡 − 푏퐹푡−1푅 푓푡−1 − 푖퐻푡 − 푐푡 − 푟푥푡 + 푟푥푡−1푅푟푡−1)
+ 휆2푡











The first-order conditions with respect to 푐푡 , 푟푥푡 , 푏퐹푡 , 푖푡 푘푡+1, 푥푡 , 푖퐻푡 , 푖퐹푡 in that order is
푈′(푐푡) = 휆1푡 (1.27)




휆1푡 = 퐸푡 (훽휆1푡+1푅 푓푡 ) (1.29)
휆2푡 − 휆3푡 = 0 (1.30)




퐸푡 (−훽휆1푡+1퐴푡+1푘훼푡+1 + 훽휆4푡+1(1 − 훿)) = 휆4푡 (1.32)
−휆1푡 + 휆3푡 퐹푖퐻푡 = 0 (1.33)
퐸푡 (훽휆1푡+1(1 − 푥푡)
휕퐴푡+1
휕푖퐹푡
푘훼푡+1) + 휆3푡 퐹푖퐹푡 + 휆4푡
1
푘푡+1
− 휆5푡 = 0 (1.34)

















푡 that satisfies condition equations (1.22) - (1.34) and
equations (1.19) - (1.21), given the same exogenous stochastic processes on technology 퐴2푡 , 퐴
3
푡
and interest rate 푅푟푡 , 푅
푓
푡 as in the competitive equilibrium, which will be discussed later in terms of
the specific functional form.
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1.4.8 Social planners and the competitive equilibrium
I argue that by choosing the optimal policy variables, the central bank and government can replicate
the social planner’s optimal solution under competitive equilibrium.
Suppose that we have the solution from the social planner’s problem. The variables 휆1푡 -휆
5
푡 , 푐푡 ,
푟푥푡 ,푘푡+1, 푖푡 , 푏퐹푡 , 푥푡 , 푖퐻푡 , and 푖퐹푡 are already pinned down by the social planner’s equilibrium condi-
tions. Now, we need to pin down the other corresponding variables by letting them satisfy all the
competitive equilibrium conditions. Then, I argue that by satisfying equation (1.22) to equation
(1.34) and equations (1.19) to (1.21), the competitive equilibrium conditions (1.2)-(1.17) are also
satisfied.
































this replicates the first-order conditions in the social planner’s problem. Specifically, the equations
for the firm’s problem under competitive equilibrium (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) and (1.11) to (1.15), given
the value of the variables discussed above, are exactly equal to equations (1.23) (1.24) (1.25)
and equations (1.30) to (1.34). The former sets of equations hold as long as the latter sets hold.
Equation (1.5) is satisfied automatically by defining the output level. Equation (1.10) is satisfied
automatically by defining the profit level. Equation (1.9) is satisfied automatically by defining the
technology level.
Let us then match the household problem under the competitive problem and the social planner’s
equilibrium. Equation (1.3) corresponds to equation (1.27), as is satisfied by the equivalence of
휆1푑푡 = 휆
1







. Note that this is the same as
the interest rate of borrowing from abroad 푅 푓푡 by equation (1.29)
In the foreign investors’ problem, (1.18) to (1.21) are also included in the social planner’s problem,
so they are automatically satisfied.
The only equations left in the competitive equilibrium are equations (1.2), (1.16) and (1.17). Since
everything else is pinned down, (1.2) pins down the level of domestic borrowing/saving 푏퐻푡 . Then,
(1.16) is automatically satisfied by subtracting (1.2) from (1.22). Equation (1.17) pins down the
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level of 푇푡
This completes the proof that competitive equilibrium. Equations (1.2)-(1.17) are also satisfied
once we have the social planner’s optimal solution and the corresponding optimal interest rate and
optimal tax rate on FDI.
1.5 Model parametrization
1.5.1 Households and preferences
I use the following standard functional forms for utility
푈 = 푙표푔(푐푡)
The household discount factor 훽 is pinned down by the interest rate on foreign debt to ensure the
existence of steady state.
1.5.2 Foreign investors
휁 is the key parameter in the analysis of foreign investors and is central to the mechanism of the
model. As first shown in equation (1.18), 휁 measures the reserves’ ability to reduce the volatility
of the expected return on FDI and thus increase FDI inflow. Therefore, I calibrate 휁 by directly
measuring its impact on the volatility of stock market returns from the data. The procedures for
doing so will be explained in section 1.6.1. It is set to 0.1 in the baseline analysis. I also compare
it to the result from directly assessing reserves’ impact on increasing FDI inflow from the data.
These two empirical measures are compatible with one another, although the analysis with FDI
inflow provides a wider region for pinning down the parameter. The detailed discussion on this
parameter is provided in both the empirical findings discussed in section 1.3.2 and the analysis on
the effect of the critical parameters in section 1.6
훽푖 is the discount factor for foreign investors and is calibrated using the empirical fact that the return
on FDI is on average approximately 10% as documented by Bosworth, Collins and Chodorow-
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Reich (2007)
훾 is the risk-aversion parameter for foreign investors and set to 4, which is a standard value in the
literature
푏 is the fraction of wealth consumed by investors. It is pinned down by the steady-state level of
the consumption-to-wealth ratio for US households, which is 0.7
1.5.3 Firms and production
The aggregation function for total investment (푖푡) composed of foreign investment (푖퐹푡 ) and domes-
tic investment (푖퐻푡 ) is modeled as taking a constant elasticity of substitution form.
푖푡 = 퐻 (휙푖퐹푡 휌 + (1 − 휙)푖퐻푡 휌)
1
휌
where 퐻 is a constant and 휙 measures the share of domestic and foreign investment in total invest-
ment. 휌 measures the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign investment.
휌 is set to 0.1 in the benchmark analysis, and I will discuss the model’s robustness to different
values of 휌. In the benchmark case, the elasticity is 1/(1 − 0.1) = 1.11, which is slightly higher
than in the Cobb-Douglas case, in which 휌 → 0 and the elasticity is 1. However, it will be shown
that the level of 휌 does not affect our result of interest.
휙 and 1 − 휙 are calibrated to match the empirical observation that 푖퐹푡푖푡 = 0.15, which is calculated
using the average FDI inflow over the fixed capital formation for the EM economies in the sample.
퐻 is chosen to match the steady-state domestic investment share in total investment and set to 0.85,
푖퐻푡
푖푡
= 0.85. Thus, total investment in the steady state is equivalent to the summation of domestic
and foreign investment. The price of total investment in terms of consumption/investment goods
is exactly 1 in the steady state.
In the production function, 푦 = 퐴푘훼, the Cobb-Douglas parameter 훼 is set to 0.3, which is a
common value in the literature.
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1.5.4 Technology process and shocks
The technology process takes the following functional form





The technology level 퐴 increases when there is an increase in FDI inflow 푖퐹푡 . 퐴푡,3 is the level
of technology when foreign investment (FDI inflow) is 0, in which case total investment consists
solely of domestic capital. 퐴푡,2 measures the ability of FDI inflow to increase technological de-
velopment. 퐴1 is a constant to adjust for the share of the technology level that is affected by FDI
inflow. 퐴3푡 and 퐴
2
푡 follow an exogenous process subject to shocks in the economy
푙푛퐴푡+1,2 − 푙푛퐴2 = 휌퐴 (푙푛퐴푡,2 − 푙푛퐴2) + 휖 퐴2푡+1 (1.36)
푙푛퐴푡+1,3 − 푙푛퐴3 = 휌퐴 (푙푛퐴푡,3 − 푙푛퐴3) + 휖 퐴3푡+1 (1.37)
where 휖 퐴2푡+1 ∼ 푁 (0, 휎퐴2), 휖 퐴3푡+1 ∼ 푁 (0, 휎퐴3)
퐴1, 퐴2, and 퐴3 are calibrated using the following three conditions.
• 퐴3 is set at 57.9% of the level of 퐴, which matches the average technology level in 1980
relative to the technology level in 2017 for 33 EM countries. The technology level in 1980
is assumed to represent the condition when bilateral FDI flows are 0.
• In steady state, the investment-to-output ratio is the average investment-to-output ratio for
the 33 EM countries in the sample, which is 0.24.
• The standard percentage deviation from the trend of the reserves-to-GDP ratio in the data is
14.32 %
The persistence of both shocks is taken to be the same, 휌퐴 = 0.9. This is taken from Eichen-
baum (1991), where different values of the quarterly persistence level between 0.863 and 0.986 are
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considered.
The standard deviations 휎퐴2 and 휎퐴3 are taken to be the same to match the standard deviation of
technology 퐴 over the mean of technology in the data, which is a 5.3% deviation from the trend.
The technology level is calculated using the residual from capital and labor input in EM countries.
I follow the method of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). The precise steps are explained in detail in
Appendix A.4
The other two shocks in the economy come from exogenous processes 푅푟푡 and 푅
푓
푡 , the return on
reserve assets and the borrowing cost of external debt, respectively. I assume that both of them
follow an AR(1) process with persistence levels of 휌푅푟 and 휌푅 푓 , respectively:
푅푟푡+1 − 푅푟 = 휌푅푟 (푅푟푡 − 푅푟) + 휖푟푡+1 (1.38)
푅
푓
푡+1 − 푅 푓 = 휌푅 푓 (푅 푓푡 − 푅 푓 ) + 휖 푓푡+1 (1.39)
The level of 푅푟 is calibrated using the US Federal Funds rate, the level of 푅 푓 is calibrated using
the EMBI sovereign spread index, and their corresponding standard deviations are 휎푅 푓 and 휎푅푟 .
The persistence levels of the shocks 휌푅푟 and 휌푅 푓 are taken from Neumeyer and Perri (2005), where
the persistence level of world interest rate shock is estimated to be 0.81, and that of emerging
economies is 0.78. The full set of parameters and their corresponding values are summarized in
Table 1.3 below.
Table 1.3: Parameter values after calibration
Parameter Description Value
Household
훽 Household discount factor 0.9434
Firm
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훼 Cobb-Douglas parameter 0.3
휙 foreign investment share in total investment 0.0925
휌 elasticity of substation between foreign and domestic
investment
0.1
H scale parameter of investment 1.3647
훿 capital depreciation rate 0.1
Foreign investors
휁 reserves ability in attracting FDI inflow 0.1
훾 risk aversion parameter or investors 4
푏 investors’ share of consumption in total wealth 0.7
훽푖 investors’ discount factor 0.4512
Exogenous
푅푟 steady state return on reserve assets 1.015
푅 푓 steady state borrowing cost of external debt 1.06
퐴1 parameter in A 0.1941
퐴2 steady state of 퐴푡,2, FDI technology 0.52
퐴3 steady state of 퐴푡,3 0.27
휌퐴 persistence level of the shock process 0.9
휌푟1 persistence level of the shock process 0.81
휌푟2 persistence level of the shock process 0.78
휎푅푟 sd of 푅푟 0.0063
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휎푅 푓 sd of 푅 푓 0.0259
휎퐴 sd of 퐴2 and 퐴3 2.15%
Note: The table summarizes the parameter values taken in the model
1.6 Equilibrium level of foreign reserves and key parameters
Given the parameter values discussed above, the model predicts that the reserves-to-GDP ratio is
23% in steady-state value.
This prediction is much larger than those in the previous literature. It is closer to the average in
recent years, as I show in the graphs in the empirical section 1.3.2, and closer to the average level
of the reserves-to-GDP ratio for the East Asian economies. This suggests that by incorporating the
incentives for attracting FDI inflow for reserve holding, I can explain the larger amount of reserves
held by EM economies.
However, this result is sensitive to the parameter values I assign to the two main mechanisms in
the model: the parameter that measures reserves’ ability to increase FDI, 휁 , and the parameter that
represents the level of FDI inflow to increase the technology level, 퐴2. I next discuss in detail some
empirical evidence on these parameters, how I calibrate them and what the economic meanings of
the values of the these parameters are.
1.6.1 The value of 휁








This equation is a reduced-form equation taken from a simpler case when letting FDI be a one-
period asset for foreign investors.
푖퐹푡 = 푎푡 (푊푡 − 퐶푡) = (1 − 푏)푊푡
퐸푡퐺
푓
푡+1 − 푅1 + 휎푡+12
훾휎푡+1
where I assume that 푟푥푡 reduces the volatility of the return 휎푡+1 by letting 휎푡+1 = 푟푥−휁 .
I first show that there is indeed a negative correlation between the volatility of returns and the level
of reserves in the data, and I then measure how large the parameter 휁 is.
I use stock market volatility as a proxy for the volatility of the expected return on risky FDI assets
for foreign investors. There are two reasons that I select this proxy. The first is that there is no
good measure of the precise return on FDI from investing in each of the EM economies. The stock
market return is relatively more accessible and comparable across economies. The MSCI country
index has a good coverage of 30 economies out of the 33 economies in my sample. The similar
standard in picking stocks to ensure a fair representation of the underlying local equity markets
make it more comparable across economies. The second reason is that since engaging in FDI aims
to buy a share of a firm, it is reasonable to assume that it pays the same return as other portfolio
investment, which is represented in general by the economies’ stock market returns.
The stock market return index, MSCI country index,5 covers all the EM economies in my sample
except Iran, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia. I take the monthly data from 1980-present and calculate
each month’s return based on the index. The volatility of the return in each year is calculated as
the past three years of volatility and then annualized.
I plot the volatility against the reserves-to-GDP ratio across economies and over time in figure 1.6.
As the figure shows, high return volatility is correlated with a lower level of the reserves-to-GDP
ratio, and this negative relationship is very significant. The negative relationship is also robust to
grouping the observations by economy or by date, as shown in Appendix A.3.
5The data are obtained from Factset
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Note: This figure plots the stock market return volatility again the reserves-to-GDP ratio for the
EM economies in the sample.
Source: World Bank WDI, Factset MSCI
To pin down the level of 휁 in 휎푡+1 = 푟푥
−휁
푡 , I run the following empirical regression.
푙표푔(휎푖푡) = 훽 + 훽1푙표푔(푟푥푖푡−1) + 훽2푙표푔(푔푑푝푖푡−1) + 푎푖 + 푏푡 + 휖푖푡 (1.41)
where 푎푖 refer to time fixed effects and 푏푡 refers to economy fixed effects
The result of this empirical analysis on parameter 휁 is presented in table 1.4. Because I assume
that 휎푡+1 = 푟푥
−휁
푡 , the parameter in front of the variable 푙표푔(푟푥) is the empirical measure of 휁 . The
number ranges from −0.08 to −0.136. I employ −0.1 in the baseline analysis in the model, which
means that 휁 = 0.1
I also compare this number with the empirical analysis on FDI inflow and reserve levels to deter-
mine whether the level of 휁 also conforms with the empirical evidence corresponding to equation
1.40.
The empirical regression I present in table 1.2 suggests that a 1% increase in the reserves-to-GDP
ratio corresponds to a 0.02%-0.076% increase in the FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio. In essence, if we
take GDP as constant across all cases and recognize that the reserve level is five times that of
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Table 1.4: Correlation between stock market volatility and reserve level
Dependent variable: Stock market volatility (3-year moving window)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(rx) -0.136∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.029) (0.037) (0.027)
Log(gdp) 0.094 -0.182∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗ -0.213∗∗
(0.063) (0.042) (0.055) (0.085)
Time fixed effect No No Yes Yes
Country fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Observations 643 643 643 643
R2 0.107 0.467 0.418 0.694
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
FDI inflow, this indicates that a 1% increase in the reserve level corresponds to a 0.1%-−0.35%
increase in the FDI inflow level. I further run a similar regression of equation 1.41 by regressing
푙표푔(FDI inflow) on 푙표푔(푟푥), which yields an estimate of 휁 in the range 0.16 − 0.28. This evi-
dence suggests that 휁 = 0.1 is a reasonable and conservative measure for how reserves reduce the
volatility of the return and provide a lower bound in the data on how reserves increase FDI inflow.
I employ 휁 = 0.1 in the benchmark analysis if not otherwise stated and relax the number in the
robustness checks in Appendix A.5
1.6.2 The level of A2
The change in the level of parameter 퐴2 also changes the steady-state level of the reserves-to-GDP
ratio. As in equations (1.9) and (1.36), 퐴2 is the steady state of 퐴푡,2, which measures the ability of
FDI inflow to increase the technology level. Since it is not feasible to obtain a direct measure of this
effect, I calibrate it to match the percentage deviation from the trend of the reserves-to-GDP ratio
in the model with the data. The interpretation of 퐴2, combined with the level of 퐴3 as a fraction of
퐴, is the percentage increase in FDI inflow for increasing the technology level. In steady state, 퐴3
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is calibrated to be 0.58, and 퐴2 is calibrated to be 0.4. This approach gives the interpretation that a
1% increase in FDI inflow over GDP yields a 0.22% increase in the technology level.
This value of 퐴2 is also a reasonable and conservative estimation based on the empirical evidence
in this study. To provide an empirical justification for the level of 퐴2, I calculate the technol-
ogy process of the 33 EM economies in the sample by calculating the Solow residuals based on
the information on GDP, employment, and capital level. The detailed steps of calculation are de-
scribed in Appendix A.4. Then I run the following regression between productivity level A across
economies and the FDI inflow across economies.
푙푛퐴푖푡 = 훽푙푛퐹퐷퐼푖푛 푓 푙표푤푖푡 + 푎푖 + 휖푖푡
To account for the reverse causality that investors will invest more when the productivity level is
higher, I use the risk-free rates taken from the Kenneth R. French Library to instrument for the level
of FDI inflow. The intuition is that when using the risk-free rates to instrument for FDI inflows,
we are utilizing the variations in FDI inflows due to the changes in the risk-free rates. When risk-
free rates are higher, the investors have lower incentives to invest in risky FDI assets. However
when the interest rates are lower, investors seek yields and thus invest more in the risky FDI assets,
leading to more FDI inflows for EM economies. On the other hand, the change in the risk-free
rates should not affect the variations in technology levels. I further add economy fixed effects to
the regression to account for potential difference across economies.
Table 1.5 reports the result of the IV regression using three different periods. The earliest record
for FDI inflow for the 33 EM economies in the sample is from 1968, which is presented in column
1. I also check the periods corresponding to the main period of empirical analysis in section 1.3,
from 1980 to 2017, in column 2. Then I check the periods using the same length as the calibration
to 휁 , from 1987 to 2017, in column 3. The three regressions by including different periods suggest
that 훽 is between 0.21-0.32. The interpretation of 훽 is the percentage increase in A when there is
a 1% increase in FDI inflow. The regression results suggest that that number used in the baseline
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Table 1.5: Correlation between technology level and FDI inflow
1968-2017 1980-2017 1987-2017
lnA lnA lnA
lnfdi 0.217∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0137) (0.0223)
_cons 7.839∗∗∗ 7.703∗∗∗ 6.903∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.116) (0.194)
푁 1079 1002 867
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
* 푝 < 0.05, ** 푝 < 0.01, *** 푝 < 0.001
model 0.22 is a conservative and reasonable estimation also based on empirical evidence. The
robustness checks for the equilibrium and dynamic movements of the model by varying 퐴2 are
discussed in the Appendix A.5
The two key parameters also suggest an explanation for the heterogeneity in reserve holding be-
havior across EM economies. The crucial impacts that these parameters have on the steady-state
level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio suggest that exploring the exact levels of these parameters can be
used to explain the heterogeneity in the levels of reserves across economies. The average level of
Latin American economies’ reserves-to-GDP ratio is approximately 10%, which can be explained
by motives such as precautionary savings. However, the average level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio
for Asian economies is over 20%, which requires a high probability of crisis to justify under the
precautionary saving motive. However, using the possible incentive of attracting FDI inflow by
holding reserves can account for the gap between the optimal level of reserves in past theories and
the data. To better estimate the magnitude of this channel and its relative significance compared
to other reserve holding incentives, we need to obtain more precise measures from the data for
different economies of interest. This will be an essential aspect of future research on this channel
if more micro-level data become available.
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1.7 Technology shock
After discussing the equilibrium level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio, we can examine the dynamics
of the variables of interest after technology shocks.
There are two kinds of technology shocks in the model based on the technology process specified
in the model.
퐴푡 = 퐴푡,3 + 퐴1(푖퐹푡−1)퐴푡 ,2
where 퐴3푡 and 퐴
2
푡 follow two exogenous processes:
푙푛퐴푡+1,2 − 푙푛퐴2 = 휌퐴 (푙푛퐴푡,2 − 푙푛퐴2) + 휖 퐴2푡+1
푙푛퐴푡+1,3 − 푙푛퐴3 = 휌퐴 (푙푛퐴푡,3 − 푙푛퐴3) + 휖 퐴3푡+1
We call the shock to 퐴푡,2 the FDI technology shock and the shock to 퐴푡,3 the classical technology
shock. An increase in 퐴푡,2 means that an increase in FDI inflow is more capable of increasing
the technology level of the economy. This can be regarded as a better absorption of the advanced
technology of the parent economy through better training or the presence of more high-skilled
workers. An increase in 퐴푡,3 is similar to standard technology shocks, where productivity is higher,
which has nothing to do with the level of FDI inflow. It is reasonable to assume that both kinds
of technology shock vary along the business cycle. FDI inflow sometimes contributes more to
technology and sometimes contributes less. The classic technology shock also experiences booms
and busts.
1.7.1 The FDI technology shock 퐴2
Figure 1.7 plots a 10% increase in the FDI technology 퐴푡,2. We can see that 퐴푡,2 increases by
10% following the shock and gradually returns to the steady state. The increase in 퐴푡,2 increases
in the marginal benefit of FDI inflow and thus the marginal benefit of holding reserves. We hence
observe an increase in reserves after the shock. The FDI inflow correspondingly increases, so we
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Note: This graph plots the impulse responses for a 10 % FDI technology shock on 퐴푡,2
observe an increase in 푖퐹푡 . The increase in reserves is financed by an increase in the foreign debt
level 푏퐹푡 , a temporary decrease in the consumption level 푐, and a temporary decrease in domestic
investment 푖퐻푡 . These are the costs of holding reserves. The simultaneous increase in the marginal
cost and marginal benefit of holding reserves generates the co-movement between external debt
and the reserve level. This explains why the economy simultaneously borrows and saves.
1.7.2 The classic technology shock 퐴3
Figure 1.8 plots a 10% increase in the classic technology 퐴푡,3. We can see that 퐴푡,3 increases by
10% following the shock and gradually returns to the steady state. The increase in the classic
technology shock increases the expected return on capital. One key reason that foreign investors
invest in the domestic economy is the expected return. Following the increase in the classic tech-
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Note: This graph plots the impulse responses for a 10 % classic technology shock on 퐴푡,3
nology shock, foreign investors become more interested in investing in the economy for a given
reserve level. The increase in the capital stock decreases the marginal productivity of capital and
thus reduces the marginal benefit of holding reserves to attract one additional unit of capital. We
can thus observe an initial decrease in the reserve level. The economy also allocates resources to
domestic investment to make use of high technology. We can see that there is an increase in 푖퐻푡 ,
and the economy is borrowing more from the rest of the world 푏퐹푡 . These behaviors are the same
as in the classic RBC model, which predicts that a positive technology shock leads to more invest-
ment, less saving and more borrowing. The FDI inflow is higher following the shock because of
the high expected return. As the shock gradually vanishes, we observe that the economy begins to
accumulate more reserves to slow the process of FDI inflow converging back to the steady state.
The difference between the increases in 퐴3 and 퐴2 is the change in the marginal benefit of hold-
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ing reserves, which can be decomposed into two parts: the marginal benefit of investment and the
marginal increase in investment due to a unit increase in the reserve level. An increase in the FDI
technology shock does not significantly affect the level of technology but increases the marginal
benefit of foreign investment. In contrast, an increase in classic technology shock substantially af-
fects the level of technology and causes an increase in foreign investment. This increase in foreign
investment significantly lowers the marginal benefit of the investment. The different directions
of the movements in the marginal benefit of investment cause reserve levels to move differently
following the two technology shocks.
퐸푡
( (훽휆1푡+1(1 − 푥푡) 휕퐴푡+1휕푖퐹푡 푘훼푡+1 + 휆3푡 퐹푖퐹푡 + 휆4푡 1푘푡+1 )︸                                                    ︷︷                                                    ︸









The allocation puzzle refers to the empirical observation that there is a negative correlation be-
tween economies’ net inflows of capital and productivity growth and was initially highlighted by
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). It is considered a puzzle since one would expect that according to
the classical real business cycle model, capital would flow to economies with higher technology
growth. This means that if we compare economies in recent decades, we would expect those with
higher average productivity growth to be those with higher capital inflow. However, empirically,
as I show below, the pattern is the opposite: economies with higher average productivity growth
are those with lower capital inflow. The model discussed in this paper can generate the pattern
described in the puzzle. The short explanation is that following technology shocks, there is pub-
lic capital outflow (reserves) intended to attract private capital inflow (FDI inflow). On net, we
observe a negative correlation between net capital inflow and technology growth.
I first provide empirical evidence of this phenomenon by replicating the result of Gourinchas and
Jeanne (2013). I then present the empirical counterpart in this paper by showing that the puzzle is
resolved if we only consider the empirical FDI flow. However, the foreign reserve outflow is also
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higher in economies with higher technology growth. The last step is to simulate the model and
demonstrate that it generates the same pattern as we observe in the data, and the explanation for
the puzzle is precisely the mechanism proposed in the model.
1.8.1 Empirical observations
The empirical observation of the allocation puzzle is summarized in Figure 1.9. I plot the average
productivity growth over the period 1980-2000 for 66 economies on the x-axis, and the average
capital inflow is represented by the negative of the current-account-to-GDP ratio 퐶퐴푡퐺퐷푃푡 on the y-
axis. The details of the data construction can be seen in Appendix A.4. The graph suggests that
among the 66 developing economies in the sample, economies with higher average productivity
growth over the period 1980-2000 experience less net capital inflow on average.
Figure 1.9: Allocation puzzle, net capital inflow and productivity growth
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Note: Author’s calculation. Due to the lack of current account data for some economies, there are
59 observations in this figure. The calculations of the technology growth and net capital inflow
are described in Appendix A.4.
Source: Penn World Table and World Bank WDI.
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Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) further divides the net capital inflow into private flows and public
flows and concludes that there is no puzzle if we only consider private flows. Economies with
higher productivity growth are indeed associated with higher net private capital inflow. However,
public flows show that economies with higher productivity growth are associated with less net
public inflow.
When describing the motivation for this study, I noted that the liabilities of emerging economies
are mainly composed of FDI liability (private capital inflow) and that their assets are mainly com-
posed of RX (public capital outflow). When FDI inflow and reserve assets are plotted against
productivity growth, we observe the pattern that generates the allocation puzzle. The private FDI
inflow correlates positively with productivity growth, as does the public reserve outflow.
Figure 1.10 shows the positive correlation between FDI inflow and productivity growth. On the x-
axis, I have the same productivity growth for the 66 countries shown in Figure 1.9. On the y-axis, I
plot the change in FDI between 1980 and 2000 by summing all the FDI inflows during the 20-year
period and scale each year’s FDI inflow by the investment price level in that year. The details of
the data are described in Appendix A.4. Figure 1.10 suggests that when considering private FDI
flows, countries with higher technology growth indeed attract higher FDI inflow.
Figure 1.11 shows the positive correlation between the increase in reserve position and productivity
growth. I have the same x-axis as in the previous two figures. The y-axis plots the change in reserve
position over the period 1980-2000. The construction of the reserve outflow is analogous to that
of the FDI inflow. Figure 1.11 suggests that when considering public reserve outflow, economies
with higher technology growth also experience larger reserve outflows.
To summarize, the empirical evidence suggests a negative correlation between capital inflow and
technology growth. However, if I decompose the inflow into public and private, specifically reserve
outflow and FDI inflow, there is a positive correlation between FDI inflow and technology growth
and a positive correlation between reserve outflow and technology growth. This causes a negative
correlation between net inflow and technology growth.
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Figure 1.10: FDI inflows and productivity growth
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Note: Author’s calculation. There are 66 observations in the figure. The calculations of the
technology growth and FDI inflow are described in Appendix A.4
Source: Penn World Table and IMF International Financial Statistics
1.8.2 Model simulations
The model can generate the same correlations we see in the empirical observations. The model
indicates that higher productivity growth correlates with less net capital inflow, larger FDI inflow,
and larger reserve accumulation. To mimic the same technology growth process we observe in the
data, I use the technology growth inferred from the data to feed into the shock processes in the
model.
There are four shock processes in the model, namely, equations (1.36) to (1.39). Since the technol-
ogy shocks in the model affect the components of 퐴푡 , 퐴푡,2 and 퐴푡,3, I do not have direct observations
of the processes of 퐴푡,2 and 퐴푡,3 in the data. The only observation I have from the data is on the
aggregate technology growth 퐴푡 . Thus, I feed into the simulation process the same technology
growth rate as in the data to both 퐴푡,2 and 퐴푡,3. If the observed growth rate of technology in a
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Figure 1.11: Reserve outflows and productivity growth
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Note: Author’s calculation. There are 66 observations in the figure. The calculation of technology
growth and the change in reserves assets are described in the Appendix A.4
Source: Penn World Table and IMF International Financial Statistics
specific year is 3%, then I let 퐴푡,2 and 퐴푡,2 experience the same percentage shock in that year. The
interest rate shocks on 푅푟푡 and 푅
푓
푡 are shut down in the simulation. The simulation is performed for
the technological progress of all 66 countries used in the empirical analysis.
I begin the simulation from the steady state, treating that as t=0. The persistence parameter 휌퐴 is
changed to 1 so I can more easily match the actual technology growth. The actual data I have are a
series of technology growth observations from 1980 to 2000 for 66 economies, where each number
represents the growth rate between two consecutive years, e.g., 푔푑푎푡푎푡 . Each period’s technology








Under this construction, the percentage change in 퐴2푡 and 퐴
3
푡 from the steady state in the model is
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the same as the percentage change in 퐴 from the initial period in the data. Although this setup does
not necessarily generate the same average productivity growth in the model as in the data, the two
are quite similar. In Figure 1.12, I have the simulated average productivity growth for 20 periods
plotted on the x-axis and the actual average productivity growth from the data plotted on the y-axis.
The simulated average technology growth is calculated by using the last period’s technology level
퐴푖20 and taking the geometric average. The dots almost align on a 45-degree line, suggesting that
the simulated productivity growth is close to the actual productivity growth.
Figure 1.12: Model simulated productivity growth and actual productivity growth
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Note: The x-axis depicts the simulated technology growth. The y-axis depicts the actual
technology growth. The straight line is a 45-degree line, suggesting 푦 = 푥.
Figure 1.13 depicts the model simulated version of the allocation puzzle. The y-axis plots the
average net capital inflow over the initial output. The x-axis plots the average technology growth.
There is a clear negative correlation between technology growth and average capital inflow. After
I simulate the model with the shocks described above, I calculate the average current-account-to-
GDP ratio (푐푎/푦) as the average over the 20 periods and take the negative of it as the net capital
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inflow. The average productivity growth is the same as discussed above.
Figure 1.13: Model simulation of the allocation puzzle
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Note: Model simulation of the allocation puzzle.
Note that the negative correlation in Figure 1.13 is the combination of the effect of the FDI technol-
ogy shock, 퐴푡,2, and the classic technology shock 퐴푡,3. The FDI technology 퐴푡,2 shock increases
the marginal benefit of FDI inflow, since now one unit of FDI inflow can contribute more to the
technology level. The increase in the marginal benefit of FDI inflow needs to be accompanied by
a decrease in the marginal increase in FDI inflow per unit increase in reserves to equalize equation
(1.42). The decrease in the marginal increase in FDI inflow can be achieved by an increased level
of reserves. The increase in FDI inflow cannot compensate for the increase in reserve level, and we
see a strong negative correlation between technology growth and capital inflow under 퐴푡,2, which
is shown in Figure 1.14
The classic technology shock 퐴푡,3 generates a consistent result with what we would expect from a
neoclassic growth model. Higher technology growth corresponds to larger capital inflows, which
is shown in Figure 1.15. The graph is plotted by only feeding in the model the classic technology
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Figure 1.14: Model simulation with only FDI technology shock 퐴푡,2
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Note: Model simulation of the allocation puzzle, with only the FDI technology shock.
shock 퐴푡,3 and shutting down the FDI technology shock 퐴푡,2. The classic technology shock induces
a sizable increase in foreign investment in the first place but not the marginal benefit of foreign
investment. This significant increase in FDI inflow reduces the marginal benefit of FDI inflow.
Thus, it needs to be compensated by a reduction in reserve levels, that is, to make the marginal
increase in FDI inflow larger for a unit increase in the reserve level, to make equation (1.42)
equalized. The increase in the FDI inflow and the reduction in the reserve level together contribute
to the positive correlation of technology growth and capital inflow.
Overall, with both shocks in 퐴푡,2 and 퐴푡,3, the combination suggests that the 퐴푡,2 overturns the pos-
itive correlation arising from the 퐴푡,3 shock and gives us the negative correlation of the allocation
puzzle with both shocks in the model.
Figure 1.16 shows the model-simulated version of the positive correlation between technology
growth and the change in reserve position. The change in reserve position is taken as the deviation
of the last period’s reserve from the steady state. When productivity growth is high, there is also
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Figure 1.15: Model simulation with only FDI technology shock 퐴푡,3
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Note: Model simulation of the allocation puzzle, with only the classic technology shock.
more substantial reserve outflow.
Figure 1.17 shows the model-simulated version of the positive correlation between technology
growth and FDI inflow. The FDI inflow is calculated as the total FDI inflow for all periods relative
to the initial output. When productivity growth is high, there is a larger FDI inflow.
Overall, the model matches the observations in the data. The explanation for the allocation puzzle
based on the model is precisely the mechanism of the model, in which the public capital outflow is
used to incentivize private capital inflow.
1.9 Reserves correlation with other variables
In this section, I compare the model’s unconditional moments to the data. To do so, I conduct a






푡 , and 휖
퐴3
푡 and
feed them into the policy functions to obtain the time-series for all other variables.
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Figure 1.16: Model simulation of reserve outflows and productivity growth
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Note: Model simulation of the allocation puzzle between reserves and technology growth.
Table 1.6 shows the moments and correlations of reserves and other macro variables, providing a
comparison between the data and model. I report the comparison of the data to the model both
under all shocks and one shock at a time.
In general, I can reproduce the correlations between reserves and other variables. The model pre-
dicts a similar level of volatility of the current-account-to-GDP ratio as observed in the data. The
correlations between the reserves-to-GDP ratio and FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio are close to the actual
moments from the data. The correlation between the reserves-to-GDP ratio and FDI-stock-to-GDP
is more substantial than the data, probability due to the lack of adjustment cost for both variables.
The correlation between the reserves-to-GDP ratio and GDP is positive, as in the data. The cor-
relation between the reserves-to-GDP ratio and the external-debt-to-GDP ratio for the full model
is slightly negative compared to what we see in the data. However, we do observe positive co-




푡 ). The negative correlation
is dominated by the classical technology shock 퐴3, due to the restriction that the sizes of the two
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Figure 1.17: Model simulation of FDI inflows and productivity growth
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Note: Model simulation of the allocation puzzle between FDI inflow and technology growth.
shocks be equal.
Comparing the model’s performance under specific shocks, we can see that the model under the
classical technology shock indicates that the reserves-to-GDP ratio has negative correlations with
the FDI-inflow-to GDP ratio, the output level and the external-debt-to-GDP level. These are of the
opposite directions from the observations in the data.
The model predicts a higher level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio for EMs than observed in the data,
suggesting that countries are under-accumulating reserves on average. However, the predicted level
of the reserves-to-GDP ratio is closer to the level of Asian economies, which are the economies
that are accused of over accumulating reserves to an extent that is difficult to justify using classical
incentives. The result from the model shows that, by allowing for the incentive of attracting FDI
inflows into the country, one can generate a much larger level of the equilibrium reserves-to-GDP
ratio.
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Table 1.6: Business Cycle Moments
Variable Data Model Model (A2) Model (A3) Model (R1) Model (R2)
Targeted
휎푟푥/푦 14.37% 14.63% 5.64% 7.48% 13.09% 17.3%
Non-Targeted
휇푟푥/푦 13% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23%
휎푐푎/푦 80% 89.34% 6.37% 14.75% 20.38% 76.49%
휌(푟푥/푦, 푖퐹푡 /푦) 0.52 0.53 0.61 -0.28 0.73 -0.38
휌(푟푥/푦, 푘퐹푡 /푦) 0.43 0.89 0.52 0.41 0.39 0.35
휌(푟푥/푦, 푦) 0.10 0.57 0.61 -0.24 0.54 0.72
휌(푟푥/푦, , 푏 푓 /푦) 0.35 -0.11 0.34 -0.15 0.59 0.89
1.10 Conclusion
Why do we observe large accumulations of reserves? This paper answers this question from a
novel perspective: public capital outflow is intended to attract more private capital inflow. This ex-
planation also speaks to the co-movements of capital flows observed in the data on EM economies.
It is important to emphasize that I abstract from some important features of foreign exchange
reserves as analyzed in the literature, including precautionary savings and reducing the probability
of a crisis. Including these features would unambiguously lead to an increase in the optimal level
of reserves. However, the aim of this paper is not to provide policy guidance regarding the optimal
level of reserves. It should instead be used to understand the unexplored incentives for reserve-
holding behavior. If there were policy coordination between investor economies and the recipient
economies on other signals instead of foreign exchange reserves, the cost of attracting private
investment will be significantly reduced for EM economies. Such policy discussions regarding
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optimal reserve-holding behavior could be further pursued by multilateral institutions such as the
IMF and central banks around the world as an important area for future research.
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Chapter 2: Do FDI firms create more jobs than domestic firms for each
dollar of assets?
This chapter is coauthored with Sakai Ando. We thank colleagues in IMF for constructive discus-
sion. The paper does not reflect the view of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. All
errors are ours
2.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) brings many different benefits, but the most wanted benefit might
differ depending on the recipient economies. For example, some economies might be most inter-
ested in the tax revenue generated by foreign-participated companies. The economies that aim to
catch up with advanced economies may find knowledge transfer to be the main benefit. For other
economies (for instance, those already at the technology frontier), job creation can be the benefit
of interest.
Among the various dimensions of FDI, this paper specifically focuses on job creation. The job-
creation benefits that FDI may generate in recipient economies is usually underscored by both the
firms engaged in FDI and policy makers. For example, large MNEs that are often subject to the
accusation of tax avoidance use job creation to justify their business in the local economies.1 Policy
makers often accolade FDI by quoting the total value of the investment and the jobs it creates.2
Despite its relevance, the aspect of job creation has been under-explored in the literature.
This paper is an attempt to fill the gap by studying whether, for each dollar of assets, FDI firms hire
more employees than domestic firms. To answer the question, we use the firm-level data of Orbis
1For example, Apple Inc. has websites to advertise the total number of jobs it creates in each economy.
https://www.apple.com/uk/job-creation/
2U.S. president Donald Trump mentioned in his 2017 tweet “Toyota & Mazda to build a new $ 1.6B plant here in
the U.S.A. and create 4K new American jobs. A great investment in American manufacturing!”
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by Bureau van Dijk to construct a unique dataset of FDI and domestic firms. Specifically, we use
the ownership structure data to classify each firm into FDI or domestic and use the financial state-
ment to construct its employment per asset ratio. To prevent “phantom FDI” from contaminating
the analysis, we also remove special purpose entities (SPEs) from the main specification.
As the main result, we show that, in most economies, domestic firms create more jobs than FDI
firms for each dollar of assets. Specifically, in 2016, in 41 out of 51 economies in the sample, the
mean of the log employment per asset for domestic firms is significantly higher than that for FDI
firms. This result is robust to alternative definitions of FDI and SPEs.
To understand the structure of the aggregate result, the paper compares FDI and domestic firms not
just for each economy but also for each industry. The case study of the United Kingdom shows
that domestic firms create significantly more jobs per asset in 9 out of 11 industries. This result
suggests that the main result is not driven by a particular industry but is a common feature across
different industries.
The analysis at the industry level also explores the cross-country relationship between industry
composition and the difference in job creation between FDI and domestic firms. It is shown that
domestic firms tend to create more jobs per asset if a higher fraction of domestic firms is in con-
struction, wholesale trade, or services. The result suggests the driving industries that help predict
the difference in job creation between FDI and domestic firms at the aggregate level.
Finally, we leverage the time-series dimension of the data by tracing the firms that change own-
ership from FDI to domestic and vice versa as well as those with stable ownership. The sample
from 2011 to 2016 reveals that (1) the ownership change itself does not have an immediate impact
on the behavior of employment per asset and (2) the always-domestic firms hire significantly more
employees per asset than the switchers and always-FDI firms. These results suggest that the behav-
ior of job creation is not so much driven by the ownership structure itself as by the technological
characteristics of the firms that are owned or traded by foreign investors.
The interpretation and the resulting policy implications of the analysis need to be understood with
care. On the one hand, the fact that domestic firms create more jobs compared with FDI firms with
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similar asset sizes suggests that attracting FDI firms may not be the best policy for the purpose of
job creation in the short run. On the other hand, the fact that firms with similar asset sizes can be
operated with a smaller number of employees is consistent with more efficient operation, which
can contribute to longer-run productivity gains.
2.2 Literature
There is a strand of literature focusing on the labor market effects of FDI, but the data tend to
be limited to a particular industry or a specific economy. Harrison and Scorse (2005) use data
on firms in Indonesia to find that the wage premium paid by foreign establishments during the
1990s were robust to the inclusion of workers characteristics, suggesting that the higher wage
premiums may be due to a foreign firm’s higher spending for training, partly in order to retain
workers. Harrison and McMillan (2011) use U.S. MNEs data and study the impact of U.S. MNEs
offshore jobs on domestic employment. They show that the effect of job shifting to offshore on the
domestic labor market is limited. Lundin et al. (2007) study the impact of FDI on employment in
the Chinese manufacturing industry, suggesting that the FDI entry into China has positive effects
on employment growth in the manufacturing industry.
Although the job creation aspect of FDI has been under-explored, other gains from FDI have been
studied extensively. For example, there is a large literature on the productivity gain and technology
spillover of FDI. Aitken and Harrison (1999) use panel data on Venezuelan plants and suggest
that foreign equity participation is positively correlated with plant productivity, but the spillover
effect is small. Smarzynska (2004) uses firm-level data from Lithuania and shows that spillovers
are associated with projects with shared domestic and foreign ownership but not with fully owned
foreign investments. Matthew (2007) use the plant-level panel data of the United Kingdom and find
a significantly positive correlation between a domestic plant’s TFP and the foreign-affiliate share of
activity in that plant’s industry. Alfaro et al. (2003) relates inward FDI to the local financial market
and finds that economies with well-developed financial markets gain significantly from FDI.
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2.3 Data
This section describes the Orbis database and the cleaning process. Regarding the data cleaning
process, we introduce three layers of cleaning in addition to dropping missing values, i.e., (1)
dropping the data related to consolidated financial statements, (2) classifying firms into FDI and
domestic firms, (3) dropping Special Purpose Entities (SPEs). Appendix B.1 presents the table of
summary statistics of the cleaning process.
The Orbis database used in this paper is a commercial database compiled by Bureau van Dijk
(BvD). It reports the information of firms financial statements collected from administrative sources
and its coverage extends to more than 300 million firms across the world. Orbis is one of the most
comprehensive firm-level databases that cover both listed and unlisted firms across the world, al-
though some quality concerns have already been known in the literature as discussed by Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2015) and Tørsløv, Wier and Zucman (2018).
The main analysis of this paper uses the 2016 data of each firms (1) number of employees, (2)
total asset, (3) nationality of shareholders, and (4) direct and total percentages of shares held by
the shareholders. We choose 2016 as the benchmark since 2016 data is the most complete recent
data due to the reporting lags of Orbis as of 2019. The four variables are taken from the financial
historical database and historical ownership database of Orbis, which are then matched using the
unique BvD firm identifier.3
We implement three more steps to filter out the data suitable for the analysis, in addition to the
standard data cleaning process to keep the non-missing observations. The first step is to drop the
observations of the consolidated data in Orbis. Consolidated data aggregate up the information
of all the subsidiaries into the group total, including those incorporated abroad. As a result, the
number of employees in the consolidated data does not necessarily reflect the employment in the
economy where the parent firm is incorporated.4
3The analysis at industry level in section 2.5 and that of the switching firms in section 2.6 further restrict the
observations to those that have industry information and those that can match past data respectively. The number of
the observations in each analysis will be reported in each section.
4The parent firm is often incorporated in a tax heaven with small population, in which case the number of employees
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The second step is to classify firms into FDI and domestic firms. Ideally, the identification of FDI
firms should follow the definition of the direct investment enterprises in the Balance of Payments
Manual 6th edition (BPM6). In practice, however, the information in Orbis is not sufficient to
directly apply BPM6. The next section explains the issue and describes the definition adopted in
this paper.
2.3.1 Classifying firms into FDI and domestic firms
BPM6 defines a direct investment enterprise as an entity subject to control or a significant degree
of influence by a nonresident entity. The definition of control or influence is further divided into
(1) the immediate direct investment relationship where a nonresident entity directly owns more
than 10 percent equity with voting power and (2) the indirect direct investment relationship where
a nonresident entity can exercise more than 10 percent voting power through a chain of direct
investment relationships.
Figure 2.1 describes an example of both the immediate and indirect direct investment relationships,
where firm 퐴 is a nonresident entity and firm 퐵 , 퐶 , and 퐷 are resident entities in the economy.
The percentage indicates the equity share with voting power and the vertical line represents the
boundary of economic territories. In this example, firm 퐵 and 퐶 are the direct investment enter-
prises of firm 퐴 since firm 퐴 directly owns more than 10 percent equity of firm 퐵 and 퐶 . Firm
퐷 is also a direct investment enterprise of firm 퐴 , even though firm 퐴 has no equity of firm 퐷 ,
because 퐴 has an influence of 10 percent voting power on firm 퐷 through firm 퐵 and 퐶 .
Similar to BPM6, the ownership structure data in Orbis are also divided into two types, direct and
total percentage, although the definitions have subtle differences. Table 1 illustrates an example
similar to Figure 1 that shows how Orbis records such a situation, assuming that firm A is incor-
porated in the United States and firm 퐵 , 퐶 , and 퐷 are in China. Each firm and shareholder has a
2-digit identifier of the location of the economy at the beginning of their ID. The ownership share
is reported in either direct percentage or total percentage.
in the consolidated data can exceed the population of the economy.
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Figure 2.1: Firm B, C, and D are all direct investment enterprises of firm A
Firm ID Shareholder ID Direct percentage Total percentage
CN000B US000A 50 NA
CN000C US000A 50 NA
CN000D US000A NA 5
CN000D CN000B 5 NA
CN000D CN000C 5 NA
Table 2.1: Format of shareholder information in Orbis
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Figure 2.2: Total percentage in Orbis overestimates indirect direct investment enterprises
Note that the total percentage of 퐴 on 퐷 is 5 = (0.5 × 0.05 + 0.5 × 0.05) × 100 instead of 10 .
This is because the total percentage in Orbis is calculated by summing up the multiplication of the
shares throughout the chains. In contrast, BPM6 counts the voting power using only the last legs,
i.e., 5+5 = 10 . The rest of the chains are used only to make sure that every investment relationship
is chained by more than 50 percent equity share so that the parent firm has control over the voting
decision of the last legs.
Using the total percentage in Orbis to estimate the direct investment enterprises in BPM6 can end
up with both under- and over-estimation. Figure 2.1 is an example of under-estimation. Over-
estimation can also happen if the number of firms in the middle increases. Suppose that, instead
of firm 퐵 and 퐶 , firm 퐴 has 10 percent equity shares of firm 퐵1, . . . , 퐵10 and each of them has 10
percent shares of firm 퐷 as in Figure 2.2. The total percentage in Orbis is 10 , but the voting power
in BPM6 is 0 since firm 퐴 does not have control of firm 퐵1, . . . , 퐵10 .
The patterns of the existing and missing data add further complications to the identification of
direct investment enterprises. In some cases, the direct percentage of all the shareholders of a
firm does not sum up to 100, implying the possibility of either missing shareholder information
or the possibility that the direct percentage is recorded in the total percentage column. In other
cases, only the names of the shareholders are reported without any information on the direct or
total percentage.
Given these difficulties in identifying direct investment enterprises, this paper adopts a simpler
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definition than BPM6 by restricting FDI firms to those with at least one foreign shareholder owning
more than 10 percent share in either direct or total percentage. To demonstrate the robustness of the
analysis based on this definition, Appendix B.3 shows that the main result in section 2.4 remains
similar after replacing 10 by 50 so that firms are restricted to those that are under the control of
foreign parent companies.
2.3.2 Treatment of Special Purpose Entities
The last step of the data cleaning is to drop the Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) from the sample.
SPEs refer to the legal entities that are used to fulfill the special purpose of firms, such as isolating
financial risks and tax avoidance by multinational firms. As discussed by Damgaard, Elkjaer and
Johannesen (2019), SPEs are often considered to be pass-through entities and do not reflect the
real activities that FDI statistics intend to capture. The existence of SPEs can change the FDI data
significantly as discussed in IMF (2018).
To prevent SPEs from driving the result, this paper excludes SPEs from the analysis. Following
the definition proposed by IMF (2018), FDI firms with less than 5 employees are defined as SPEs
and dropped from the main analysis. To ensure that the result is not driven by domestic shell
companies, the main analysis also excludes domestic firms with less than 5 employees.
Although the threshold of 5 employees is a crude definition, it turns out that the results of the
main analysis are robust to alternative definitions. Appendix B.4 and B.5 discuss the robustness by
using two alternative definitions of SPEs. The first one is to keep all the domestic firms but drop
the FDI firms with less than 5 employees. The second one is to use the lower 5 percentile of the
employment distribution instead of 5 employees.
In summary, the definition of FDI and domestic firms used in this paper is as follows.
Definition. Fix a firm in Orbis identified by the unique BvD firm ID. The firm is an FDI firm if (1)
it reports an unconsolidated financial statement, (2) it has at least one foreign shareholder owning
more than 10 percent share in either direct or total percentage, and (3) it has at least 5 employees.
The firm is a domestic firm if it satisfies ( 1 ), ( 3 ), and ( 4 ) all the foreign shareholders hold less
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than 10 percent share in both direct and total percentage.
2.4 Main analysis
This section analyzes whether FDI firms create more jobs than domestic firms for each dollar
of assets. We describe our approach and show that, in many economies, domestic firms create
more jobs for each dollar of assets. The main analysis at the aggregate level motivates more dis-
aggregated analysis at the industry and individual firm level in the following sections.
The comparison of the FDI firms and domestic firms is based on the number of employees divided
by the total asset. Given the fat tail distribution of the financial statement variables, we take the log
as is suggested by Willett (2015). Thus, each firm is represented by
푒 = 푙표푔10(Number of employeesTotal assets ) (2.1)
There can be multiple legitimate interpretations for employment per asset 푒 . One interpretation is
how efficiently the firm can create jobs given the same size of the asset. Another is how efficiently
the firm can operate using the employees. Since the interpretation can depend on the specific
context of the readers, this paper avoids the evaluative term “efficiently” and just neutrally call 푒
employment per asset.
Note that the measure of employment per asset 푒 may not have a direct connection with the pro-
ductivity of the firm. The productivity of a firm usually refers to the ratio of output to inputs. The
total asset, however, is not necessarily a measure of the output but can include both the value of
the capital used for production and other activities including investment in financial instruments.
Therefore, the two concepts do not necessarily have a one-to-one mapping with each other. The
asset serves as the normalization tool to compare different firms.
The comparison between FDI and domestic firms in each economy is based on hypothesis testing.


















where 푒퐷표푚 and 푒퐹퐷퐼 are the random variables drawn from the distributions of domestic and FDI
firms. The t-statistic of the test is
푡 =
푒¯퐷표푚 − 푒¯퐹퐷퐼√
푉ˆ (푒¯퐷표푚 − 푒¯퐹퐷퐼)
where 푒퐷표푚 and 푒퐹퐷퐼 are the sample means of the employment per asset for domestic and FDI
firms, and 푉ˆ is the estimated variance. The observations are assumed to be i.i.d., so the estimated
variance is the sum of the sample variances. Since the hypothesis testing is based on the large
sample theory, we drop the economies with either the number of FDI or domestic firms less than
50 .
The main result is plotted in Figure 2.3. Each dot corresponds to the t-statistic of an economy. The
red dashed line is the 10 percent acceptance region of the null hypothesis. The figure is ordered by
the t-statistic and a larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that on average domestic firms
create more jobs than FDI firms for each dollar of assets.
Figure 2.3 suggests that, in most economies, domestic firms tend to create more jobs than FDI
firms for each dollar of assets. One can see that some economies exhibit large positive t-statistics,
but no economies exhibit large negative t-statistics. In this sense, there is not much qualitative
heterogeneity across economies.
Figure 2.4 suggests that the large t-statistics for some of the economies are not driven by outliers.
It shows the density of FDI firms and domestic firms for the three largest t-statistic economies.
One can see that, although the fatness of the densities are different across economies, they all have
larger t-statistics because the densities of FDI firms are shifted to the left side of those of domestic
firms and is not because of outliers.
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Figure 2.3: Domestic firms create more jobs per asset in most economies
Note: Y-axis denotes the t-statistics. A larger number suggests that it is more likely that on
average domestic firms create more jobs than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. The number of
observations can be found in Table B.1.
Figure 2.4: The largest t-statistics economies are not driven by outliers
2.4.1 Discussion about the main result
One natural question is whether the result in Figure 2.3 is robust to alternative specifications of FDI
and domestic firms. Figure 2.5 shows that the qualitative result survives even if all firms with less
than 100 employees are dropped. Thus, dropping small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
does not change the insight.
In the appendix, we show additional results about the robustness of Figure 2.3. Specifically, the
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Figure 2.5: The result survives if all firms with less than 100 employees are dropped
Note: Y-axis denotes the t-statistics. A larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that on
average domestic firms create more jobs than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. Red dots
correspond to those whose result of the hypothesis test changed from Figure 2.3.
qualitative result remains similar if (1) the total assets are replaced by shareholders funds (Ap-
pendix B.2), (2) the 10 percent threshold in the definition of FDI firms is replaced by 50 percent
(Appendix B.3), (3) the definition of SPEs is restricted to FDI firms and all domestic firms are
included in the exercise (Appendix B.4), and (4) the 5 employee threshold in the definition of SPE
is replaced by 5 percentile (Appendix B.5). These robustness checks suggest that the main result
does not so much hinge on the details of the FDI-related concepts as represents the overall pattern
of the data at the aggregate level.
Another natural question is whether Figure 2.3 implies that domestic firms pay a larger amount of
wage and other financial benefits for the employees. For this question, we can use the information






Figure 2.6 shows that, in the majority of the economies, domestic firms spend more on the cost of
employees than FDI firms for each dollar of assets, although more economies than Figure 3 exhibit
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Figure 2.6: Heterogeneity increases if the number of employees is replaced by their cost
Y-axis denotes the t-statistics. A larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that, on average,
domestic firms spend more on the cost of employees than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. Red
dots correspond to those whose result of the hypothesis test changed from Figure 2.3.
the opposite pattern. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the wage for each employee is
higher in domestic firms. What it means is that domestic firms not only create more jobs but also
generate more total income for workers than FDI firms for each dollar of assets in many economies.
2.5 Analysis at the industry level
Section 2.4 has studied job creation at the aggregate level by comparing all the FDI and domestic
firms. This section explores further granularity of the data at the industry level. Specifically, we
dig deeper into two aspects of the main result in section 2.4.
The first aspect is the industry fixed effect. It is of natural interest to see whether the aggregate
result holds in the individual industry. We show that, for the case of the United Kingdom, domestic
firms create more jobs than FDI firms for each dollar of assets in all industries.
The second aspect is the cross-sectional relationship between the aggregate result and industry
composition. Whether higher t-statistic comes from a larger share of certain industries in the
economy is an intriguing question. We show that a larger share of domestic firms in construction,
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wholesale trade, and services is associated with a higher t-statistic of domestic firms creating more
jobs than FDI firms for each dollar of assets at the aggregate level.
2.5.1 Comparison of FDI and domestic firms at the industry level
The industry level comparison of this section focuses on the United Kingdom. The United King-
dom is the economy with the highest t-statistic in Figure 3 among those that have industry infor-
mation for more than 90 percent of the firms. Thus, the United Kingdom is the most informative
economy in the sample for the exploration of the driving industries behind the difference in job
creation between FDI and domestic firms.
Figure 2.7 suggests that domestic firms create more jobs per asset than FDI firms in all industries
in the United Kingdom. It shows the same exercise of t-statistics as Figure 3 except that the x-axis
is the individual industry in the United Kingdom instead of the economies. One can see that all
t-statistics are positive, although some of them are statistically insignificant.
Figure 2.7: Domestic firms create more jobs per asset in all industries of the United Kingdom
Y-axis denotes the t-statistics. A larger t-statistic in y-axis suggests that domestic firms are likely
to create more jobs than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. X-axis denotes industries based on
US-SIC where TCEGS represents transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary
service and Unknown represents the firms without industry information.
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Figure 2.8: Services and manufacturing are the two highest t-statistics industries
The left column shows the densities of the employment per asset for services and manufacturing
industries. The first row of the right column shows the percentage of the firms in the services
industry within FDI firms (blue) and domestic firms(red). The second row of the right column
shows the corresponding shares for the manufacturing industry.
To see further details, Figure 2.8 presents the distributions of employment per asset for the two
highest t-statistics industries. The left column shows the densities of the employment per asset
for services and manufacturing industries. One can see that the distributions of domestic firms are
more right-shifted than FDI firms in both industries. The first row of the right column shows the
share of the services industry within FDI firms and domestic firms, while the second row shows
the shares for the manufacturing industry. One can see that, in terms of the number of firms, the
two industries have large shares in both groups of FDI and domestic firms.
The high aggregate t-statistics in Figure 2.3 for the United Kingdom is, therefore, not a result of a
few outlier industries or firms but is a general behavior of the FDI and domestic firms. Interestingly,
the services sector that constitutes the largest share in both the FDI and domestic firms exhibit the
sharpest contrast between the two groups of the firms. In the next subsection, we study whether
there is a relationship between the structure of the industry and the difference in job creation
between FDI and domestic firms.
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2.5.2 Industry composition and cross-sectional pattern of job creation
The analysis so far has focused on the comparison between FDI and domestic firms within the same
economies. Whether the cross-sectional differences in job creation can be predicted by different
economic structure is of natural interest.
Figure 2.9: Sectors whose larger shares are positively associated with FDI-domestic difference
Y-axis denotes the same t-statistics as Figure 2.3 with ISO2 label for top 5 economies. A higher
t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that domestic firms create more jobs than FDI firms per
asset. X-axis denotes the share of the number of firms in the industry within domestic firms. A
larger share in the above three industries is associated with a larger aggregate difference between
domestic and FDI firms.
Figure 2.9 presents the cross-sectional pattern of differences in job creation against the industry
structure measured by the share of the number of firms in the industry within domestic firms. One
can see that a larger share in construction, wholesale trade, and services predicts is associated with
a higher likelihood that domestic firms create more jobs than FDI firms for each dollar of assets.5
The pattern does not hold as clearly as the above three industries when it comes to other industries.
For example, the financial industry can exhibit low employment per asset in both FDI and domestic
firms due to the nature of the business, but as in Appendix B.6, it turns out that the size of the
financial industry is not correlated with the difference in job creation between the two groups of
firms.
5Note that the regression cannot be interpreted as causality since both axes are endogenous variables and should
be interpreted as prediction based on correlation.
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2.6 Analysis of switchers
The previous sections have studied the data of a single year. This section explores the time se-
ries dimension by analyzing the firms that switch ownerships between domestic and FDI firms.
Although focusing on switchers implies that the sample is limited to a subset of brownfield FDI
firms, and thus excludes greenfield FDI firms, the analysis has the advantage of controlling some
of the firms fixed effects.
The analysis focuses on the firms that have changed ownership status between FDI and domestic
from 2013 to 2014. As in section V.A., we use the United Kingdom as an example to visualize
the exercise. The switchers are compared with non-switchers with 2 years lag and forward. Al-
though the non-switchers are natural candidates for control groups, switchers may possess their
own unique characteristics that drove them into the switchers in the first place, so the result needs
to be interpreted with care. Specifically, we study the following four groups of firms.
1. Firms that are domestic firms from 2011 to 2016.
2. Firms that are domestic firms from 2011 to 2013 and FDI firms from 2014 to 2016.
3. Firms that are FDI firms from 2011 to 2016.
4. Firms that are FDI firms from 2011 to 2013 and domestic firms from 2014 to 2016.
Figure 2.10 shows the time series of employment per asset ratio in Eq. 2.1 for the four groups of the
firms. One can see that the ownership change from 2013 to 2014 does not have an obvious impact
on the employment per asset in itself. Rather, the always-domestic firms have higher employment
per asset ratio uniformly over time. An interesting observation is that always-FDI firms do not
necessarily exhibit the lowest employment per asset ratio, although the FDI-to-domestic group is
based on a small sample size of 44. The same chart is plotted for Russia, Germany, and all firms
in the world in Appendix B.7, exhibiting similar stable patterns as the United Kingdom.
The result suggests that the behavior of job creation is not so much driven by the ownership struc-
ture itself as by the technological characteristics of the firms that are owned or traded by foreign
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Figure 2.10: The four groups do not exhibit obvious patterns of change in the United Kingdom
Y-axis denotes the mean of the log employment per asset ratio for the four groups of firms. There
is no obvious change of pattern after the ownership change from 2013 to 2014.
investors. In other words, the image of foreign vulture funds taking over firms and laying off
employees for cost-cutting is not what the data show. Rather, the firms that receive cross-border
investment possess certain production technologies in the first place. One policy implication is that,
although domestic firms create more jobs per asset, policies to force changes of ownership from
FDI to domestic firms do not necessarily lead to immediate job creation, unless the underlying
production technology also changes.
A regression-based analysis can be conducted using the difference-in-difference framework. Ap-
pendix B.8 applies the regression with firm and time fixed effects to all the firms in all economies.
Consistent with the analysis in the current section, it is shown that there is no systematic difference
before and after the ownership change.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that, in most economies, domestic firms create more jobs than FDI firms for
each dollar of assets. In the industry level analysis of the United Kingdom, it is shown that the
aggregate result is not driven by certain industries, and instead, domestic firms tend to create more
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jobs per asset than FDI firms in all industries. The switchers analysis suggests that the change of
ownership itself does not have immediate impacts on the behavior of job creation, and therefore,
the difference between FDI and domestic firms may rather reflect the technological difference of
the firms owned by foreign investors rather than the ownership structure itself. The analysis implies
that policies to attract FDI firms might not be the most effective instrument for the purpose of job
creation, and therefore, it might be more effective to put other aspects including technological
transfer at the center of the discussion of FDI-promotion policies.
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Chapter 3: Liability Dollarization and Contractionary Devaluation:
A model based evaluation
3.1 Introduction
Emerging markets borrow from international borrowers not only in their domestic currencies but
also in foreign currencies. A large fraction of the external debt in emerging markets is not denomi-
nated in their own currencies. According to the World Bank, in 2016, Brazil has 94% of the public
debt denominated in USD, Argentina has 70%, and Mexico has 55%. Many other countries have
similar situations.
International investors prefer dollar-denominated assets to avoid exchange rate fluctuation risk.
This situation forces emerging markets borrowers to issue dollar-denominated debt instead of their
own currency-denominated debt. The existing amount of foreign currency debt would pose policy
concern to domestic central banks. The conventional monetary policy that requires devaluation
to boost the domestic economy might not be suitable for a highly indebted country with foreign
currency debt. The substantial debt burden brought by devaluation might overturn the benefits of
being able to move the exchange rate freely.
Economists and policymakers have been trying to examine the detrimental effects of having lia-
bilities in foreign currencies. The existence of foreign currency-denominated debt might give rise
to a completely different optimal monetary policy. If this concern is not taken into account, deval-
uation predicted by the standard New Keynesian model will do more harm than benefits when a
small open economy faces negative external shocks.
To fully address this problem, we need first to address directly the channel of devaluation that
leads to output and investment contraction if the economy has full autonomy of its exchange rate
policy. There are two sides to a devaluation policy. On the positive side, the world’s demand for
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domestic goods will be greater if the depreciation in the exchange rate leads to a decrease in the
price of domestic exportable goods in terms of foreign currency. The export will be stimulated due
to the relatively lower domestic goods price. If we further assume domestic consumption is also
composed of domestically produced goods and foreign goods, then this relative price change can
also increase the demand for domestic goods from the domestic side. The decrease in the relative
price of domestic goods leads to a demand increase both from domestic consumers and foreign
consumers. But on the negative side, if the economy has a certain amount of debt denominated
in foreign currencies, upon devaluation, the nominal amount of debt will be larger in terms of
the domestic currency. By intuition, this is a channel that cannot be neglected when modeling
monetary policy for a small open economy.
This paper revisits the foreign currency liability problem by proposing a simple model that speaks
directly to the mechanism of the detrimental effect of liabilities denominated in foreign curren-
cies of emerging markets. The model adds borrowing friction to the small open economy when
borrowing from foreign lenders. When entrepreneurs, the owner of the firms, borrow from the
international lenders to finance domestic investment, they are facing a working capital constraint,
that a fraction of the borrowed debt has to be held in domestic currency risk-free assets. This can
be interpreted as setting aside a certain fraction of the resources for paying wages to workers, or as
a potential carry trade that the firms are exploiting the domestic high interest rate compared to the
world interest rate. The model further features nominal rigidity, that the price of the domestically
produced goods is rigid.
The asset holding constraint and the domestic nominal rigidity lead to the contractionary effect of
devaluation that the model can generate. When there is a devaluation of the domestic currency, due
to the price rigidity, the income of the firm shrinks compared to its foreign currency debt. Due to
the asset holding constraint, the entrepreneurs can not fully smooth away the relative larger debt
burden. These then transfer to a lower investment level, and thus a lower output and capital stock.
The model can also provide quantitative evaluation and thus policy guidance based on this con-
tractionary devaluation effect, and can speak specifically to each country with different levels of
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debt.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I summarize the literature on this
question by discussing their channels of frictions in international borrowing, potential drawbacks,
and contradictions. In section 3.3, I introduce the model. In section 3.4, I explain the primary
mechanism that the model delivers, which is used to address the specific liability dollarization
problem and provide calibrations of the key parameters in the model. In section 3.5, I discuss the
results and provide policy guidance. In section 3.6, I briefly discuss the welfare loss of the business
cycle and summarize my thoughts on future directions of research in section 3.7.
3.2 Literature Review
My research relates to two strands of literature, the currency mismatch, and the exchange rate
policy. Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), discuss the currency mismatch problem for Korea.
In the paper, they use a model with the financial accelerator mechanism. The key assumption is
that borrowing cost depends on the leverage ratio for a small open economy, which can be directly
affected by the exchange rate regime. The higher the leverage ratio is, the higher the borrowing
cost is. This financial accelerator mechanism is the main mechanism that the paper uses to compare
different monetary policies, the Taylor rule and the exchange rate peg, under the world interest rate
shock. The paper’s conclusion is that the decrease in asset price under the exchange rate peg is
more detrimental than the increase in the debt burden due to the devaluation under the Taylor rule.
However, Cook (2004) uses the samemechanism but has opposite results. In his paper, he discovers
that the distribution of the profit of firms matters to the response to shocks. It determines who
bears the loss or the gain of the shock. Another aspect that affects the different responses is how
sensitive export depends on the relative price change. Different combinations of parameter values
will give different results to the model. Céspedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) use a simple tractable
model with the financial accelerator to explore the conditions for different results. They find that
under some parameter values, the world interest rate increase in this model will lead to a real
appreciation and thus output boom in both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes. Under other
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conditions, there will be a real depreciation after world interest rate shock. Some financially robust
economies will experience a decrease in the borrowing cost, and the financially fragile economy
will experience an increase. But both will suffer less loss from a flexible exchange rate compared to
a fixed one. These three papers use the same mechanism but reach different and some non-intuitive
results. Galí and Monacelli (2005) discuss in general the trade-off of the exchange rate in monetary
policy between stabilizing terms of trade /exchange rate, and stabilizing output gap/inflation. They
conclude that domestic inflation based Taylor rule is still the optimal monetary policy.
My research adds to the literature of closing the gap between different results of the devaluation
policies on foreign currency debt. I demonstrate the key parameters in the model that affect the
conclusion of either contractionary or expansionary devaluation. I start from only focusing on the
model’s response to exogenous exchange rate movement to discussing exchange rate policies upon
other adverse external shocks. The results will provide some policy guidance and point out the
direction for empirical validation.
3.3 Model
The model is populated by three players, the household, the firms and the entrepreneur. I will
describe them one by one.
3.3.1 Household
The economy is assumed to be populated by a large representative family with a continuum of
members. Consumption is identical across family members. Household preferences are defined




훽푡푈 (퐶푡 , 퐿푡) (3.1)
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Household gains utility from consumption and loses utility by providing labor, with the specific
GHH utility form




휔 )1−휎 − 1
1 − 휎
The sequential budget constraint of the household is given by
푄푡퐶푡 + 푆푡퐵ℎ푡 (1 + 푟푡) = 푊푡퐿푡 + 푆푡퐵ℎ푡+1 (3.2)
Where
푟푡 = 휌푡 + 퐹 (퐵ˆℎ푡 )
푄푡 is the price of consumption good domestically, 푆푡 is the exchange rate and 휌푡 denotes the world
interest rate level. 퐵ˆℎ푡 denotes the average cross-sectional level of household debt. Thus 퐹 (.) is
the country-specific interest rate premium for households. Households take the evolution of 퐵ˆℎ푡 as
given. Because agents are assumed to be identical, in equilibrium, the average cross-sectional level
of debt must be equal to the individual level of debt. 퐵ˆℎ푡 = 퐵
ℎ
푡
The functional form of 퐹 (.) is 퐹 (퐵ℎ푡 ) = 푒퐵˜푡
ℎ−퐵퐻 − 1, where 퐵퐻 is the steady-state level of house-
hold debt. Household in this case is allowed to borrow dollars and their borrowing cost depends on
the economy’s average household’s external borrowing. The higher this external borrowing is, the
larger the premium over international interest rate. There is no domestic credit market for house-
hold, household can only borrow foreign currency denominated debt. The debt elastic interest rate
is for technical reason so that the model has a unique steady state.
Household choose process {퐶푡 , 퐿푡 , 퐵ℎ푡+1}∞푡=0 to maximize the utility function (1) subject to sequen-




훽푡{푈 (퐶푡 , 퐿푡) + 휆푡 (푊푡퐿푡 + 푆푡퐵ℎ푡+1 −푄푡퐶푡 − 푆푡퐵ℎ푡 (1 + 푟푡))}
where 훽푡휆푡 denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the sequential budget constraint (2).







)−휎 = 휆푡푄푡 (3.3)























for 푖 ∈ {0, 1}. Using (7) to eliminate 푌푖푡 from (6), we would have the corresponding aggregate










Intermediate goods are produced by monopolistic competitive firms using labor 퐿푖푡 , and capital
퐾푑푖푡 . Firms pay wage 푊푡 to labor and rental rate 푅푡 to entrepreneurs, who own the capital. The
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production function is Cobb-Douglas
푌푖푡 = (퐾푑푖푡 )휃푑퐿1−휃푑푖푡 (3.9)
where 푌푖푡 denotes the quantity of intermediate good 푖 produced in period 푡. Firm 푖 face a demand
for intermediate good 푖 given by (7). Production is demand determined.
Price is sticky in the model. The firms set prices according to Calvo set up. Specifically, with
exogenous probability 휅 ∈ (0, 1), a firm cannot reset its price in period 푡. It then must charge the
same price as in the previous period, and with probability, 1 − 휅, can adjust price freely. Consider
the pricing decision of a firm that can reoptimize its price in period t. Let 푃푐푖푡 denote the price
chosen in period 푡. Then, with probability 휅 the price will continue to be 푃푐푖푡 in period 푡 + 1. With
probability 휅2 the price will continue to be 푃푐푖푡 in period 푡 + 2 and so on.




휅푠푄푡,푡+푠 (푃∗푖푡 − 푀퐶푖,푡+푠)푌푖,푡+푠
Where푄푡,푡+푠 is a state-contingent nominal discount factor that converts nominal payments in period
푡 + 푠 into a nominal payment in period t. The firm take 푄푡,푡+푠 as given. The firm picks 푃∗푖푡 to







) 1푣−1 (푣푃∗푖푡 − 푀퐶푖,푡+푠) = 0
Since all intermediate goods producers face the same rental rate and wage, their input ratio of labor
and capital are the same. In the aggregate level, the factor input and optimal conditions regarding














푊푡 = 푀퐶푡 (1 − 휃푑) 푌푡
퐿푡
(3.12)
Here we assume that the firms are risk neutral; they choose the optimal price 푃∗ to maximize the
lifetime dollar profit taking into account that they might not be able to change the price in the
following periods. The risk-neutral discount factor is thus 푄푡,푡+푠 = 훽푠 푆푡푆푡+푠 . Marginal cost 푀퐶푡 is
In the aggregate level, with the individual price-setter’s behavior and equation (8), the price of







푡−1 + (1 − 휅)푃∗푡
Log-linearize equation (10) and combine it with the above price dynamics, we can have the fol-
lowing linearized dynamics of inflation.
휋ˆ푡+1
훽휅
1 − 휅 =
휅
1 − 휅 휋ˆ푡 + (1 − 훽휅) ( 푝ˆ푡 − 푚ˆ푐푡) (3.13)
3.3.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are the owner of the firms, and they bare the profit and loss of the firms. En-
trepreneurs are in charge of investment in the economy. They can borrow in foreign currency,
here in the paper denoted as dollar, from foreign investors. Entrepreneurs face a normal budget
constraint and a working capital constraint, that a fraction of their borrowed debt has to be held in
domestic currency risk-free asset. Here I use cash as a convenience, but it can be substituted for
deposits, domestic currency bonds, etc. Their constraints are given as follows
푆푡퐵
푑






+푄푡퐶푑푡 + 푆푡퐵푑푡 (1 + 푟푑푡 ) + 푀푡+1 (3.14)
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푀푡+1 ≥ 휂푆푡퐵푑푡+1 (3.15)
퐾푡+1 = 훿퐾푡 + 퐼푡 (3.16)
In equation (14), 푆푡 , 퐵푑푡+1 denote exchange rate and borrowed foreign currency debt in period 푡, that
will be carried over to the next period. (푃푡 − 푀퐶푡)푌푡 denotes the firms’ profit that is distributed
to entrepreneurs., 푅푡 , 퐾푡 refer to the rental rate of capital and the capital stock in period 푡. 푀푡 is
the domestic asset that is required to be held by the entrepreneurs from period 푡 − 1. 푄푡 , 퐼푡 refer
to the price of capital goods, which is also the price of domestically produced goods, and the new
investment that will add on to the current stock, 12푄푡
퐼2푡
퐾푡
refers to the adjustment cost of investment.
퐶푑푡 is the consumption of entrepreneurs. 퐵
푑
푡 is the liability carried over from the last period. 1 + 푟푑푡
refers to the interest rate paid on 퐵푑푡 to the foreign investor. Here I model the interest rate to be
debt elastic, 푟푡 = 휌푡 + 퐺 (퐵˜푡). 휌푡 is the world interest rate, and 퐺 (퐵˜푡) is an increasing function
on the average cross-sectional debt taken on by each entrepreneur. This means entrepreneurs will
need to pay a higher interest rate if they have more outstanding debt. This technical assumption
is the same as the household side, will give a unique equilibrium to the debt evolvement. The last
term, 푀푡+1 is the new requirement on domestic asset holdings that need to be satisfied due to the
new debt.
Equation (15) describes the cash holding requirement, 휂 fraction of the borrowed debt has to be
held in domestic currency. In equilibrium, entrepreneur borrows the same amount of debt in each
period, and use the old asset held in domestic currency to satisfy the new requirement in each
period, such that all the newly borrow debt can be used to invest. The asset holding requirement
does not affect how much the borrowed resource entrepreneur can use to invest. It provides a way
to model more dynamics in terms of exchange rate shock. Equation (16) describes the capital
evolvement. Capital depreciates at a rate of 훿.
With the above described constraints, entrepreneurs maximize the following utility function by
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choosing 퐶푑푡 , 퐵
푑













푡+1 + (푃푡 − 푀퐶푡)푌푡 + 푅푡퐾푡 + 푀푡






−푄푡퐶푑푡 − 푆푡퐵푑푡 (1 + 휌푡 + 퐺 (퐵˜푑푡 )) − 푀푡+1 + 푞푡 (훿퐾푡 + 퐼푡 − 퐾푡+1)
+휑푡 (푀푡+1 − 휂퐵푑푡+1)
) )
푣푡 is the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (14), 푣푡푞푡 is the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (15),
푣푡휙푡 it the Lagrangian multiplier of equation (16)
The first order conditions correspond to 퐶푑푡 , 퐵
푑




푣푡푆푡 (1 − 휑푡휂) = 훽푒퐸푡
(














푄푡 + 푄푡 퐼푡
퐾푡
= 푞푡 (3.22)
Note that from equation (21) and equation (19), we can get the discount factor 훽푒, assuming that
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in steady state the borrowing premium 퐺 (퐵˜푑) is 0
훽푒 =
1 − 휂
1 + 휌 − 휂
which is smaller than 훽 = 11+휌 , the household discount factor. This suggests entrepreneurs are less
patient than household
3.3.4 Aggregate in the Economy
Domestic absorption 퐴푡 consists of both domestic produced goods 퐷푡 and foreign produced goods
퐹푡 . Domestic absorption is constitute of household consumption 퐶ℎ푡 , entrepreneur consumption


















훾훾 (1 − 훾)1−훾 (3.23)
The composition of the domestic final goods 퐴푡 gives the composition of price index푄푡 , where the






The cost minimization condition of constructing 퐴푡 gives the breakdown of 퐷푡 and 퐹푡
퐷푡 = 훾퐴푡 ( 푆푡
푃푡
)1−훾
퐹푡 = (1 − 훾)퐴푡 (푃푡
푆푡
)훾
Symmetrically, I assume export (foreign demand of domestic goods) given by




where 퐴푊푡 is the world demand, 훾푥 is the export elasticity, both are endogenously given.
The market clearing condition suggests that the domestic output 푌푡 is either domestically absorbed
or exported
퐷푡 + 퐸푋푡 = 푌푡
3.3.5 Model in real variables
The model is solved in real variables. Below I write all variables and equations that characterize














= 푄푡푆푡 , 휖푡+1 =
푆푡+1
푆푡
Then a competitive equilibrium is a set of process









푡+1, 푠푡 , 푚푡 , 푣
푟








)−휎 = 푙푎푡 푝훾푡
where 푙푎푡 = 휆푡푆푡 , the Lagrangian multiplier based on the budget constraint of household
written in real variables
2.
푙푎푡 = 퐸푡 (푙푎푡+1훽(1 + 푟푡+1))
where
푟푡+1 = 휌푡+1 + 푒푥푝(퐵ℎ푡+1 − 퐵퐻) − 1
and 퐵퐻 is SS level of household debt
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푡 + 퐵ℎ푡 (1 + 푟푡) = 푤푡퐿푡 + 퐵ℎ푡+1















푡 + (1 − 휅)푝∗푡
1
푣−1




푡 + (1 − 휅) (푝∗푡 )
푣
푣−1 = 1










+ (1 − 훽휅) ( 푝푡 − 푝푠푠
푝푠푠





1 − 휅 =
휅
1 − 휅 휋ˆ푡 + (1 − 훽휅) ( 푝ˆ푡 − 푚ˆ푐푡)
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푣푟푡 (1 − 휑푡휂) = 훽푒퐸푡
(
푣푟푡+1(1 + 휌푡+1 + 퐺 (퐵˜푑푡+1))
)
where 푣푟푡 = 푣푡푆푡 , 푣
푟
푡+1 = 푣푡+1푆푡+1, the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the budget
constraint written in real variables














, the Lagrangian multiplier corresponding to the real budget constraint
14. Working capital constraint













16. Debt dynamics dollar, 휖푡+1 exist because divide both side by 푆푡 , 푀푡+1푆푡 = 푚푡+1휖푡+1





+ 푝훾푡 퐶푑푡 + 퐵푑푡 (1 + 휌푡 + 퐺 (퐵˜푑푡 )) + 푚푡+1휖푡+1
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17. Working capital constraint
푚푡+1휖푡+1 ≥ 휂퐵푑푡+1
18. Capital accumulation
퐾푡+1 = 훿퐾푡 + 퐼푡
19. Aggregate domestic absorption






20. Demand of domestic goods in domestic absorption
퐷푡 = 훾퐴푡 푝
훾−1
푡
21. Demand of foreign goods in domestic absorption
퐹푡 = (1 − 훾)퐴푡 푝훾푡
22. Export
퐸푋푡 = (1 − 훾푥)퐴푤푡 푝−훾푥푡
23. Aggregate domestic output
퐷푡 + 퐸푋푡 = 푌푡






0 , 푠−1, 푝−1, 푚0
24. World Interest rate
휌푡 = (1 − 휙푟)휌 + 휙푟휌푡−1 + 휎푟푡 (3.24)
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25. World demand
푙푛퐴푊푡 = (1 − 휙퐴)퐴푊 + 휙퐴퐴푊푡−1 + 휎퐴푡 (3.25)
26. Exchange rate policy
휖푡+1 = 1 (3.26)
3.4 Mechanism and Calibrations
3.4.1 Parameter values
In the household utility function, 휎 and 휔 are taken to be 2 and 1.45 respectively, from Uribe and
Schmitt-Grohé (2017) Chapter 4. In the firm side, capital share 휃푑 is taken to be 0.32, from the
same source. The substitution parameter between intermediate goods 푣 = 0.9, taken from Uribe
and Schmitt-Grohé (2017) Chapter 9. 휅 is taken to be 0.75, 75% of the firms cannot adjust the
price in a certain period, which is a standard parameter for Calvo model. In the aggregate level, 훾
is taken to be 0.5; the household has equal demand for domestic and foreign goods. 훾푒푥 is taken
to be 0.1, the world demand for domestic good is not as sensitive as domestic demand for foreign
good.
World interest rate 휌 is taken as 1%, which is a conservative level of the world interest rate en-
vironment. Discount factor for household 훽 is then take to be 11+휌 . Asset holding constraint 휂 is
taken to be 0.6 unless otherwise stated. Discount factor for entrepreneurs is then calculated from
equation (3.19) and (3.21) to be 1−휌1+휌−휂
3.4.2 Mechanism
Before I present the dynamics of the variables in the model upon shocks, I first discuss the mecha-
nism that the model can generate on contractionary devaluation. The key mechanism requires both
the asset holding constraint and the nominal rigidity.
The existence of nominal rigidity guarantees that the domestic price level will not catch up with
the foreign price level upon devaluation so that there is a loss in terms of the asset side of the
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entrepreneurs. The existence of the asset holding constraint suggests that the entrepreneurs cannot
fully offset the negative effect by borrowing from international lenders.
If there is no nominal rigidity and asset holding requirement in the model, the domestic price
will adjust along with the devaluation. Firms can set prices freely in each period, so the domes-
tic price level will catch up with the exchange rate, leaving the relative price unchanged. When
entrepreneurs make their investment decisions, since there is no asset holding requirement, both
the asset and liability side expand after the devaluation. There is no increase in the debt burden,
and thus the entrepreneurs will make similar investment decisions as they would before the de-
valuation. So we would not observe contractionary devaluation if no price stickiness and no asset
holding requirement exist. When there is no price stickiness, with the asset holding requirement
alone, the wealth effect after devaluation still exists, but inflation can quickly pick up since price
is flexible, which helps to alleviate the negative effect of the wealth shock. When there is no as-
set holding requirement, even if the domestic goods price is not flexible, entrepreneurs can also
smooth consumption by borrowing more from abroad after the shock. In this way, the effect on
domestic output is also limited.
So the two conditions, the nominal rigidity and the asset holding requirement, should both exist
for a heavier debt burden after the devaluation. The heavier debt burden then transfers to a lower
investment level. The lower investment level has two effects. One is that since investment goods
is part of the output, lower investment level thus means lower demand for domestic good, which
affect current period output. The decrease in investment also means the next period capital stock
is below the steady state. So it also directly affects the next period output. The lower level of the
capital stock decreases labor productivity, and thus real wage; this will lead to the decrease in labor




Here I discuss the response of a devaluation shock of 10%. Following the conventional intuition
that if the economy has too much foreign currency-denominated debt, devaluation will cause an
increase in debt burden and thus become contractionary. Here I show how this channel is reflected
in the model.
Figure 3.1 plots the impulse response of the variables in the model upon a 10% devaluation shock.
That is, the country maintains a fixed exchange rate regime up to period t, then the country sud-
denly depreciates the exchange rate by 10% and maintain the exchange rate fixed at the new level
thereafter.
I contrast two cases in the model, one with a domestic asset holding requirement described as in the
entrepreneur’s section, one without such asset holding requirement. Without the constraint, where
there is a devaluation, domestic goods become relatively cheaper; entrepreneurs have the incentive
to borrowmore to invest. The debt burden does not become larger since they can always borrow the
same amount of real foreign debt 퐵푡+1, to repay the real debt 퐵푡 from the last period. The exchange
rate does not affect the real debt amount. The increase in borrowing is used to purchasing more
investment goods, which also drives up the level of the output, since capital goods is a part of the
output. This is the channel, combined with the boost in export due to the relative price change, that
devaluation is expansionary.
The case with constraint shows how devaluation is contractionary. Due to part of the borrowed
foreign currency held in the domestic currency asset, sudden devaluation causes a large wealth
effect on the entrepreneurs. Now they have to use part of the newly borrowed foreign currency
debt to satisfy the new asset holding requirement 푆푡퐵푡+1, where the old asset holding is 푆푡−1퐵푡
and the increase in exchange rate 푆푡 making 푆푡 > 푆푡−1. This wealth effect means that not all the
borrowed foreign currency goes into investment activity. Investment decreases and drags down the
output concurrently. The output is also below the steady-state level in the following period because
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the investment is below the steady-state level causing the capital stock for production being smaller.
The decrease in capital stock causes labor productivity to decease and thus lowers the wage level.
Household consumption is also smaller due to the lower wage income. This further decreases the
demand for domestic goods. Although export increases more in the case with constraint because
of the lower relative price, this cannot compensate for the decrease in the domestic demand.
Figure 3.1: 10 % devaluation shock, with and without asset holding constraint
Note: The figure plots the impulse responses of variables upon a 10% devaluation shock, with the asset
holding constraint and without the asset holding constraint, corresponding respectively to the
contractionary and expansionary devaluation.
The magnitude of the effect obviously depends on the level of the outstanding debt and how large
is the constraint on the asset holding requirement. Figure 3.2 addresses this magnitude with respect
91
to the outstanding external debt level, where it plots the comparison of the impulse responses of
variables upon a 10% devaluation for different debt-to-output ratios in the steady state. The con-
tractionary effect is larger for the debt-to-output ratio being 0.85 compared to the debt-to-output
ratio being 0.5. The contractionary effect also depends on the magnitude of the asset holding con-
Figure 3.2: 10 % devaluation shock, different debt levels
Note: The figure plots the impulse responses of variables upon a 10% devaluation shock, with different
debt-to-output levels in the steady state. The contractionary effect is larger when there is a higher external
debt level, meaning more foreign-currency denominated debt.
straint, which is governed by the parameter 휂. Figure 3.3 plots the comparison between different
values of this parameter, with the debt-to-output ratio fixed to be 0.5. The higher 휂 is, the larger
fraction of the borrowed foreign currency has to be held in the domestic asset, thus a larger wealth
effect upon potential exchange rate change. As from the graph, 휂 being 0.3 to 0.4 is the threshold
that investment is below the steady-state level, and the capital stock starts to fall upon the deval-
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uation. The output does not fall on impact for 휂 = 0.3 because the wealth effect on impact is
not large enough to counteract the expansion in export. But soon as price picks up, the export
advantage gradually disappears, and the output starts to fall.
Figure 3.3: 10 % devaluation shock, different magnitude of the asset holding requirement
Note: The figure plots the impulse responses of variables upon a 10% devaluation shock, with different
magnitude of the asset holding requirement. The contractionary effect is larger when 휂 is higher
3.5.2 Exogenous Shocks
Apart from the exchange rate shock, another relevant question is how should the exchange rate
change upon negative external shock. In this section I compare different exchange rate regimes
upon an increase in world interest rate.
To impose different exchange rate regimes, I need to add an interest rate policy to the model. In
this section I assume that the household is allowed to borrow in the domestic market with domestic
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currencies. The household’s budget constraint is thus changed to
푄푡퐶푡 + 푆푡퐵ℎ푡 (1 + 푟푡) + 퐵ℎ푑푡 (1 + 푖푡) = 푊푡ℎ푡 + 푆푡퐵ℎ푡+1 + 퐵ℎ푑푡+1
The first order condition with respect to 퐵ℎ푑푡+1 gives the equilibrium interest rate for domestic market
휆푡 = 퐸푡 (훽휆푡+1(1 + 푖푡)) (3.27)
This combined with equation (4) gives the relationship between domestic interest rate and the
exchange rate
1 + 푖푡 = 휖푡+1(1 + 푟푡) (3.28)
For a fixed exchange rate regime, 푖푡 moves one for one with the exchange rate according to equa-
tion (28). For a flexible exchange rate regime, I adopt two different inflation targeting rules on
interest rates from Cook (2004), Gertler Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003)(Below denoted as GGN),
to compare my results with their conclusions.
Cook monetary policy
푖푡 − 푖푠푠 = 휑푖 (푖푡−1 − 푖푠푠) + 휀푝 (휋푡 − 휋푠푠) + 휖 푖푡 , 퐸푡−1휖 푖푡 = 0 (3.29)
This follows the form of inflation targeting interest rate policy from Cook (2014). The parameter
values also follow Cook’s calibration. The interest rate has a persistent parameter 휑푖 = 0.9. The
interest rate responds to inflation when inflation deviates from the steady state, with the sensitivity
being 휀푝 = 0.1. The debt-to-output ratio is also calibrated to be 0.315 to match Cook’s paper.
Below I show the impulse response of a 0.0018 increase in world interest rate 휌푡 , where the ex-
ogenous world interest rate follows equation (24), with AR(1) parameter for the persistence level
equals to 0.84
Under the inflation targeting interest rate regime, there is a devaluation upon the world interest rate
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Figure 3.4: World interest rate shock, under the policies of exchange rate peg or inflation targeting
Note: This figure plots the impulse responses of variables upon world interest rate increase, under two
different exchange rate policies, the exchange rate peg and the inflation targeting interest rate
increase. The effect of this devaluation is the same as discussed in the contractionary devaluation
effect. Entrepreneurs will borrow more to invest when there is depreciation. Because the relative
domestic price is lower, so investment does not decrease as much as the case under exchange rate
peg on impact. But because of the extra external borrowing, the burden on the debt level will hurt
investment and output in the following periods compared to the exchange rate peg regime. In this
case, the exchange rate peg regime causes worse adverse effects on the output and investment on
impact compared to the inflation targeting regime but performs better in the following periods after
the shock, due to the lack of extra debt burden. The peg causes domestic investment and output
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to fall by a large amount on impact. Households and entrepreneurs consume very little on impact.
But there is not too much over-borrowing, thus the economy can get back to the right track quicker
than the inflation targeting induced devaluation.
This conclusion is consistent with Cook’s result, but the advantage of exchange rate peg is more
prominent in my result. Figure 3.5 is the main result of Cook’s paper. The difference in output and
household consumption is not significant between the exchange rate peg regime and the inflation
targeting regime. The consumption of entrepreneurs is larger under the exchange rate peg regime,
and so is the investment.
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Figure 3.5: Main result from Cook(2004), impulse responses upon world interest rate increase




푠푠 + 훾휋 (휋푡 − 휋푠푠) + 훾푦 (푦푡 − 푦푠푠) (3.30)
The monetary policy in GGN suggests that the interest rate responds to the inflation gap and the
output gap from the steady state. 훾휋 and 훾푦 is taken as 2 and 0.75 respectively.
If this Taylor rule is imposed in the model, the model generates an appreciation of the exchange
rate after an increase in the world interest rate. This lead to an output boom. This is an interesting
result given the context of the set up of the model. The appreciation upon an increase in the
world interest rate is an unconventional response based on common expectations. However, this is
reasonable in the setting of the model. Since I allow the channel for contractionary devaluation,
the model naturally contains the channel for expansionary appreciation. But I do not discuss this
response in depth, since the paper focuses on devaluation. This response can be left for future
discussion to consider optimal monetary policy under this setup.
3.5.3 Turning off the friction
As I discussed before, the contractionary devaluation effect would not hold without the mech-
anisms in the model. This section shows the result of shutting down the new channel of asset
holding requirement, but keep the nominal rigidity.
If we turn off the asset holding requirement, the contractionary devaluation effect is minimal, which
is shown in the graph below. This is because consumption-smoothing agents in the economy
will smooth the increase in debt burden by increasing international borrowing to pay back the
increase in debt, and there is no friction in doing so. The aggregate effect of the increase in
the nominal amount of debt measured in domestic currency does not have a large effect on the
economy. The graph below compares three conditions, no debt in equilibrium, debt denominated
in foreign currency, and debt denominated in domestic currency. When there is a sudden 10%
devaluation shock, all three conditions have an output boom due to the positive channel of the
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relative price change on the export. The output increase when debt is denominated in domestic
currency is the largest since domestic investors and consumers have wealth effects on the debt
being relatively cheaper in terms of foreign currencies after devaluation. The degree of the increase
in output under the condition when there is no external debt, and when external debt is denominated
in foreign currencies are similar. This proves that the contractionary effect from foreign currency
debt, as we described above, is minimal when there is no friction in borrowing. This channel is not
easily captured because the previous literature does not adequately detect the friction on external
borrowing.
Figure 3.6: Impulse responses upon devaluation when there is no asset holding requirement
3.6 Welfare analysis
In order to compare numerically different exchange rate regimes, there has to be a well-defined
welfare measure that can measure the loss of each exchange rate regime after exogenous shock.
Following the welfare analysis in Gali (2008), I define the welfare losses as follows. The welfare
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where 푊푡 is the welfare of the business cycle after exogenous shock. 푊푠푠 is the welfare if the
economy is always in the steady state.
Since there are two kinds of consumers in the economy, household and entrepreneurs, I weight the
total loss by their consumption in steady state.
휏ℎ =
퐶ℎ푠푠
퐶ℎ푠푠+퐶푒푠푠 , 휏푒 = 1 − 휏ℎ
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Figure 3.7 corresponds to the welfare loss of the exchange rate peg regime and the inflation target-
ing regime under the specification of section 5.2.1 with varying debt-to-output ratio. The welfare
loss for the exchange rate peg regime is always smaller than that for the inflation targeting regime.
When the debt-to-output ratio is small, the difference is not as large. But as the debt-to-output ratio
increases, the difference in the two exchange rate regimes becomes prominent.
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Figure 3.7: Welfare loss under two regimes for different levels of debt-to-output ratio
3.7 Future Works
3.7.1 Empirical validation
There are two aspects I would like to look into regarding the empirical evidence of the paper and
the currency mismatch literature in general. The first one is to estimate the parameter of asset
holding 휂. This is to measure what fraction of the external liability of a firm is held in domestic
currency-denominated assets. Bruno and Shin (2017) discuss the usage of dollar credit to the
firms. They conclude that firms use dollar credit to conduct carry trade to some extent. Those
firms who already have a large amount of cash holding are the ones who tend to borrow from
abroad and add on to their cash holding in domestic banks. This is consistent with the balance
sheet mismatch channel, that when firms borrow in foreign currency, they register the asset in
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domestic currency. To estimate the parameter, I plan to get data of the balance sheets of the firms
in small open economy and then estimate the destination of dollar credit flow. All the money that
flows into domestic asset holding, including bank deposit, inter-firm loan should be counted into
the calculation for 휂.
The second one is to estimate the borrowing cost of firms in a small open economy. Once I
have the balance sheet data, combined with dollar bond issuance data for firms in a small open
economy, I would be able to know the determinants of firms’ borrowing cost. This is another
aspect of the empirical evidence for the currency mismatch literature. It would be interesting to
know whether the country macro and political conditions affect the firms borrowing cost more or
the firms’ specific aspects like size and leverage ratio.
3.7.2 Optimal monetary policy
After estimating the asset holding parameter, I would like to see the policy implications of the
model. Based on the current welfare analysis, it’s possible to compare welfare losses of different
exchange rate regimes. I would then be able to answer the question of what is the optimal mon-
etary policy corresponding to varying levels of external dollar debt positions to conduct economy
specific analyses.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper models a channel of contractionary devaluation, which directly addresses the firms’
balance sheet mismatch channel, by adding an asset holding requirement to the firms’ external debt.
This is reasonable, especially considering countries like China that impose compulsory foreign
exchange settlement from private entities. Thus the firms are more exposed to currency risks. The
level of the contractionary effect mainly depends on the strictness of the asset holding requirement
and also on the level of the external foreign currency debt. I then compare different exchange rate
regimes upon negative global shocks. The exchange rate peg regime has a smaller welfare loss
compared to the inflation targeting regime which induces devaluation.
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The model provides a framework for further discussion of the optimal exchange rate policy for
small open economies. By analyzing the assumptions of the model and existing literature em-
pirically, the model is also able to generate policy guidance with empirical implications. These
directions are worth exploring in terms of fully understanding the balance sheet mismatch channel
for the small open economies.
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Appendix A: Appendix to chapter 1
A.1 Empirical analysis
A.1.1 Sample of countries
Emerging Market Economies
In the empirical analysis, the sample of EM economies is taken by using the union of the definitions
from MSCI, IMF and Brics+Next eleven. The three definitions include the 33 economies listed
below:
Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, Vietnam, Venezuela.
Advanced Economies
The sample of advanced economies follows the definition of IMF, covering 47 economies:
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jersey, Latvia, Liechten-
stein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Macau,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Bermuda, Canada, Puerto Rico, United States, Australia, New
Zealand
A.1.2 Other empirical evidences of co-movements
This section describe further empirical observations of the co-movement between reserve levels
and FDI levels, supplementing section 1.3
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Yearly snapshot of FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio and reserves-to-GDP ratio
Figure A.1 is composed of multiple yearly snapshots of Figure 1.5. I plot, within each year, the
FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio against the reserves-to-GDP ratio for all the economies in the sample1
for the years 2017, 2013, 2009, and 2005. The positive correlation still holds when I restrict
the economies to these individual years. Economies with a high reserves-to-GDP ratio are also
economies with a high FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio.
Figure A.1: FDI stock/GDP and Reserve/GDP, yearly snapshot



























































Note: This scatter plot shows the reserves-to-GDP ratio and FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio for 33 major
EM economies in four years.
Source: IMF IFS and World Bank WDI
1Depending on data availability, the years have slightly different samples.
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The change in the reserves-to-GDP ratio and FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio
Figure A.2 plots the percentage change in the reserves-to-GDP ratio and FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio
for the period 2009-2017. Economies that have a higher growth rate of the reserves-to-GDP ratio
also have a higher growth rate of the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio.
Figure A.2: Change in reserves and FDI from 2009 to 2017
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Note: This scatter plot shows the change in reserve stock and the change in FDI stock from 2009
to 2017 for major EM economies
Source: IMF IFS and World Bank WDI
A.1.3 Regression with control variables
The empirical model with other control variables is specified as follows
퐹퐷퐼푖푡
퐺퐷푃푖푡
= 훽1 + 훽2 푅푒푠푖푡−1
퐺퐷푃푖푡
+ 푍푖푡Γ푖푡 + 푎푖 + 푐푡 + 푢푖푡
퐹퐷퐼푖푡 refers to the FDI variable of interest; it can be FDI stock or FDI inflow as in section 1.3.
푅푒푠푖푡−1 is the amount of RX lagged by one period.
푍푖푡 are the control variables employed in the literature that are expected to affect the level of FDI. I
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include GDP growth, the interest rate, the depreciation rate, financial market accessibility, financial
market efficiency, trade openness and the external debt level.
GDP growth is directly taken from the World Bank WDI. The interest rate is operationalized as the
deposit rate for economies from the World Bank WDI. Trade openness is operationalized as the
gross imports and gross exports over the GDP level of the economy by using the corresponding
series from World Bank WDI. External debt is calculated as the external-debt-to-GDP ratio by
using the corresponding series from World Bank WDI.
The depreciation rate is calculated using the local currency and dollar exchange rate from the
IMF IFS. Financial market accessibility and financial market efficiency are taken from the IMF
Financial Development Index Database (FDID). Financial market accessibility compiles data on
large companies’ percent of market capitalization and total number of issuers of debt per 10,000
adults. Financial market efficiency compiles data on the stock market turnover ratio for each
economy.
푐푡 is a time fixed effect, which controls for the world interest rate, investor appetites, risk-taking
features, etc.
푎푖 is the economy fixed effect, which controls for the geographic features and economy-specific
characteristics.
Table A.1 uses the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio as the dependent variable. Table A.2 employs the FDI-
flow-to-GDP ratio as the dependent variable. Table A.3 employs the FDI-liability-to-total-liability
ratio as the dependent variable
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Table A.1: Regression of the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio on reserves and other controls
Dependent variable: FDI stock/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Res푖푡−1/퐺퐷푃푖푡 0.556∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.071) (0.070) (0.047)
GDP Growth푖푡 -0.001 -0.001∗ 0.0001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Deposit rate푖푡 -0.010 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Devaluation rate푖푡 0.068 0.107∗∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.074∗
(0.049) (0.037) (0.039) (0.043)
Financial Accessibility푖푡 -0.358∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.047) (0.073) (0.043)
Financial openness푖푡 -0.197∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.081 -0.099∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.068) (0.084) (0.030)
Trade/GDP푖푡 -0.002 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Debt/GDP푖푡 0.466 0.392∗∗∗ 0.217 0.112
(0.237) (0.149) (0.169) (0.230)
Constant 0.413∗∗∗
Time fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Country fixed effect No No Yes Yes
Observations 277 277 277 277
Note: Data come from World Bank WDI, IMF IFS and IMF FDID
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Table A.1 suggests that after controlling for the commonly used control variables for FDI, reserves
still have a positive and significant impact on the level of the FDI-stock-to-GDP ratio. Financial
market accessibility and openness have a negative impact on the level of FDI, suggesting that
economies with more developed financial markets might borrow more from the stock market and
debt market. This is in line with our defined characteristics for EM economies, in that they have
less developed financial markets and need to finance through FDI to fund their private firms. These
characteristics give reserves the opportunity to play a signaling role.
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Table A.2: Regression of the FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio on reserves and other controls
Dependent variable: FDI inflow/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Res푖푡−1/퐺퐷푃푖푡 0.100∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.015 0.006
(0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015)
GDP Growth푖푡 0.0001 0.00001 0.0002 0.00004
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Deposit rate푖푡 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Devaluation rate푖푡 0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.004
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Financial Accessibility푖푡 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007)
Financial openness푖푡 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Trade/GDP푖푡 -0.0001 -0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Debt/GDP푖푡 0.284 0.275∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.069) (0.069) (0.081)
Constant 0.028∗
Time fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Country fixed effect No No Yes Yes
Observations 372 372 372 372
Note: See note to Table A.1 115
Table A.2 suggests that when we account for the control variables, the effect of the reserves-
to-GDP ratio has a weaker impact on the FDI-inflow-to-GDP ratio, but the positive correlation
persists. This could be because the control variables are highly correlated with the level of reserves
and because both reserves and FDI inflow are somewhat driven by the control variables.
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Table A.3: Regression of the FDI-stock-to-total-liability ratio on reserves and other controls
Dependent variable: FDI stock/Total Liability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Res푖푡−1/퐺퐷푃푖푡 0.509∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.076) (0.092) (0.070)
GDP Growth푖푡 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Deposit rate푖푡 -0.008 -0.004∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Devaluation rate푖푡 -0.016 0.002 0.028 -0.023
(0.056) (0.037) (0.029) (0.063)
Financial Accessibility푖푡 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.049) (0.064) (0.044)
Financial openness푖푡 -0.088∗∗∗ -0.106 0.016 0.018
(0.015) (0.068) (0.060) (0.021)
Trade/GDP푖푡 -0.001 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002)
Debt/GDP푖푡 0.058 -0.047 0.214∗∗∗ 0.114
(0.098) (0.104) (0.080) (0.098)
Constant 0.423∗∗∗
Time fixed effect No Yes No Yes
Country fixed effect No No Yes Yes
Observations 277 277 277 277
Note: See note to Table A.1
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Table A.3 suggests that the reserves-to-GDP ratio has a positive and significant impact on the
FDI-liability-to-total-liability ratio. The higher the level of reserves-to-GDP ratio is, the larger the
fraction of external liability is in the form of FDI. The financial market variables have a negative
impact on this ratio, also suggesting that the more open and efficient an economy’s financial market
is, the more likely the economy is to self-finance through debt and the stock market. The deposit
rate has a significant and negative impact on this ratio and could be preliminary evidence of a
possible carry trade in economies with high deposit rates.
A.2 Micro-foundations of investor behavior
A.2.1 Investment decision rule of foreign investors
In the main formulation of the model, I let 푏 represent the constant share of wealth that is consumed
by foreign investors and, without loss of generality, model the gross safe asset interest rate 푅1 as 1.
In the multi-period case, I model investors in an overlapping generations setup to avoid accounting
for multiple shareholders of the firm and mimicking the results discussed above. Suppose that
each investor lives for two periods, young and old. The young investor in period t is endowed with
(1 − 푏)푊푡 . He or she buys the share 푥푡−1 from the previous generation using (1 − 훿)푝푥푡 . He or she
also obtains the proceeds that the previous generation had from selling the asset. He or she then
makes an investment decision regarding the FDI asset in period t 푖퐹푡 based on the return that the
next generation will obtain. He or she also receives a dividend payment from the domestic firms
푥푡−1퐴푘푡 훼푡 . At the end of the period, he or she becomes old, consumes (1−푏)푊푡+1 of the total wealth,
endows the rest of his or her wealth and sells his or her shares in firm to the next young generation.
In this way, I derive an investor wealth process that is similar to that in the single-period return
case:
푊푡+1 = (1 − 푏)푊푡 − 푖퐹푡 + 푥푡−1퐴훼푡 푘훼푡 − (1 − 훿푥)푥푡−1푝푥푡 + (1 − 훿푥)푥푡−1푝푥푡
= (1 − 푏)푊푡 − 푖퐹푡 + 푥푡−1퐴훼푡 푘훼푡
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A.2.2 Reserves and volatility of return
In the previous section and throughout the model, I assume that the volatility of returns is affected
by the level of reserves. This correlation could operate through multiple channels. The reserves
could serve as insurance held by the central bank whereby when firms seek to exit the country, the
central bank can guarantee the repayment of investments made in them. The reserves can also serve
as insurance for investors through the traditional role of maintaining exchange rate stability if the
profit of the firms is denominated in local currency but the dividend is paid in USD. Although there
is a large empirical literature on the ability of reserves to stabilize the exchange rate, as discussed
in the literature review, there is no theoretical model of this mechanism.
I do not intend to limit the analysis to a specific channel, and I would argue that the reality is a
mixture of these possible channels. However, I provide here a simple micro-foundation for the
exchange rate channel.
Apart from the players described in the main model, suppose that all decisions are made for period
t and that there is a certain amount of bonds held by traders. This means that in addition to holding
reserve assets, the central bank is borrowing in domestic currency from the rest of the world, which
pays interest rate R. The traders can decide whether to hold the bond or exchange it for dollars,




If the central bank devalues, the return on devaluation is equal to a function of reserve level. 푔(푟푥)
is an increasing function of the reserve level. The intuition is that when the reserve level is high,
the devaluation rate will be lower since more reserves would stabilize more movement. The return
in the no-devaluation case is 0 for dollar holders. The returns for bond holders are 푟, which is the
predetermined interest rate in the two cases considered here. The central bank’s decision to devalue
the currency depends on its loss of reserves, 퐿/푟푥. 퐴 measures the total amount withdrawn by
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traders. The net value of maintaining a fixed exchange rate is given by 휃- 퐿푟푥 , where 휃 is exogenous





In the first stage of the game, nature selects 휃 from an improper uniform distribution over the
entire real line. Then, each trader observes an idiosyncratic signal about 휃, which is 푥푖 and 푥푖 ∼
푁 (휃, 휎−1). The cumulative distribution function of the private signal is given by Φ(√휎(푥 − 휃)),
which also equals the fraction of traders who observe a signal 푥푖 ≤ 푥. In stage 2, the traders chose
whether to exchange their bonds for dollars with the central bank. The traders submit bid 푎푖 (푥푖, 푟)
to the central bank if they wish to exchange their bonds for dollars. The amount of reserve loss is
equal to the total demand for dollars:
퐿 (휃, 푟) =
∫
푎(푥, 푟)√휎휙(√휎(푥 − 휃))
Suppose that the solution is a threshold rule for both central banks and traders. Traders demand
dollars whenever their private signal satisfies 푥푖 ≤ 푥∗(푟), and the central bank devalues if 휃 ≤ 휃∗(푟).
The expected payoff when observing 푥∗(푟) should be equalized across the two cases; let 푝(푥∗(푟), 푟)
refer to the expected probability of devaluation:
푝(푥∗(푟), 푟) (1 − 푔(푟푥)) = 푟 = 푝(휃 ≤ 휃∗ |푥∗) = Φ(√휎(휃∗(푟) − 푥∗(푟)))






The levels of 휃 (푟) and 푥∗(푟) for the corresponding r can be solved using the above equations. A
higher level of reserves means a lower level of 휃∗(푟) for any r, which reduces the probability of
devaluation, leading to the conclusion that reserves decrease the volatility of the exchange rate.
On the equilibrium path, the central bank does not devalue with a deterministic 휃 but knowns that
there is a possibility that 휃 will be subject to a shock and drawn from the distribution noted above.
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This provides one micro-foundation for the level of reserves affecting the volatility of the return
on assets through exchange rate stability.
A.3 Return volatility and reserve levels by economy and by date
Figure A.3 plots the same observations as presented in figure 1.6 but separates the observations by
year. Within any given year, an economy with a larger return volatility has to a lower reserves-to-
GDP ratio. The negative correlation persists even if we consider a single year.
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Note: This figure plots the stock market return volatility again the reserves-to-GDP ratio for the
EM economies in the sample.
Source: World Bank WDI, Factset MSCI
Figure A.4 plots the same observations as presented in figure 1.6 but separates the observations by
country. Of the 30 EM economies in my sample, most show negative correlations. Overall, this
negative correlation is quite robust across economies and over time.
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Note: This figure plots the stock market return volatility against the reserves-to-GDP ratio for the
EM economies in the sample.
Source: World Bank WDI, Factset MSCI
A.4 Data construction for allocation puzzle
The construction of the data used in the allocation puzzle follows the method used by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2013). The raw data come from the latest version of the PennWorld Table Version 9.1,
termed PWT hereafter, and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, termed the IFS hereafter
Figure 1.9 suggests a negative correlation between the average net capital inflow and average tech-
nology growth. The data are constructed as follows:
1. Technology growth is measured using the Cobb-Douglas production function푌푡 = 퐾훼푡 (퐴푡퐿푡)1−훼;
훼 is set to 0.3. The country-specific output 푌푡 and 퐿푡 are directly taken from the PWT.
2. 퐾푡 in the above equation is measured by constructing the times-series of real investment
퐾푡 = (1 − 훿)퐾푡−1 + 퐼푡 . Real investment 퐼푡 in each period is calculated using the series Real
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domestic absorption and Real consumption in the PWT.
퐼푡 = Real domestic absorption - Real consumption
The initial level of capital 퐾0 is constructed using the standard accounting method, where
퐾0 =
퐼0
훿+푔¯ . 퐼0 is the first observation of capital, and 훿 = 0.06 is the depreciation rate em-
ployed in the paper. 푔¯ is the geometric average growth rate of investment for the first ten
observations of investment data. Then, I can obtain the series of capital levels 퐾푡 in recursive
order.
3. Average productivity growth is measured using the series of productivity 퐴 calculated above
and taking the geometric average.
4. Average capital inflow is calculated as the arithmetic average of the current account balance
- 퐶퐴푡퐺퐷푃푡 for each year because a negative current account balance indicates capital inflow. The
current account-to-GDP ratio is taken from IFS.
Figure 1.10 suggests that there is a positive correlation between FDI inflow and productivity
growth.
• FDI inflow is calculated as the accumulation of all FDI inflow from 1980 to 2000. FDI
inflow data are taken from the IFS balance of payment data at the country level.
• I adjust the inflow data from nominal USD to real USD by adjusting for the investment price
level 푝푙푖 in the PWT. Then, I sum up all the real FDI inflows between 1980 and 2000 and
divide it by the real GDP level in the initial year, 1980:∑2000
1980 Real FDI inflow푡
Real GDP1980
Figure 1.11 suggests a positive correlation between RX assets (capital outflow) and productivity
growth; countries with higher productivity growth also accumulate higher reserve assets, which
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is the capital outflow, which contributes to explaining the allocation puzzle. The construction of
RX change is the same as the construction of FDI change, with the RX data coming from the IFS
balance of payment data.
A.5 Robustness check
A.5.1 The parameter 휁
Parameter 휁 measures the ability of reserves to attract FDI inflow and affect the equilibrium level
of the reserves-to-GDP ratio. From the empirical analysis, I have pinned down the range of 휁 as
0.08 − 0.13, as discussed in section 1.6. In the main analysis, I set the level of 휁 at 0.1, within the
range of the empirical observations. Now, I can vary the value of 휁 and examine how the main
analysis changes with the change in 휁 .
The application here is analogous to that for varying the parameter 휌 described above, in that
I change the value of 휁 but fix the other parameters that I use in the main analysis to obtain
comparative results on the equilibrium level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio
Figure A.5: Change in the level of 휁


















Note: This graph plots the equilibrium level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio for different values of 휁
Figure A.5 suggests that the higher 휁 is, the larger amount of reserves held by central banks in
equilibrium. The interpretation is that a central bank would hold more reserves if one unit of
reserves can attract more FDI inflow. One might expect that if the ability of reserves to attract
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FDI inflow is very high, the central bank would not need to hold a high level of reserves to attract
a given amount of FDI inflow. However, the equilibrium level of variables is pinned down by
the optimal conditions, in which the marginal cost of holding reserves and the marginal benefit
of holding reserves should be equalized. Since for any level of 휁 , the marginal benefit of holding
reserves is decreasing in the level of reserves, a large value of 휁 corresponds to a high level of
reserves provided that the cost is the same. This is because when the reserve level is very high,
increasing reserves by one unit does not increase the benefit of holding reserves.
The different levels of 휁 also produce different responses to shocks. The impulse response for
different values of 휁 for a given FDI technology shock 퐴2 is shown in Figure A.6, where 휁 varies
from 0.03 to 0.13. The direction and shape of the reactions of all variables to shocks are the same,
but the magnitude differs. When 휁 is small, the magnitude of the increase in the reserve level is
large. This is because, for a given increase in the reserve level, a smaller 휁 means less ability
to attract FDI inflow. A large increase in reserves is need to raise the FDI inflow to the desired
level. The increase in FDI inflow 푖 푓 under different specifications of 휁 also differs. Specifically,
a smaller 휁 , which indicates a smaller impact of reserves on FDI inflow, is accompanied by both
a larger increase in reserves and a smaller increase in FDI inflow. The increase in FDI inflow
increases in 휁 .
A.5.2 The parameter 퐴2
The parameter 퐴2 measures the ability of an increase in FDI inflow to increase productivity. I
conduct similar exercises involving fixing other parameters in the model when varying the level of
퐴2 to compare the steady-state levels of the reserves-to-GDP ratio. The effect of a change in 퐴2 on
the equilibrium level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio is similar to that of a change in parameter 휁 . As
suggested in Figure A.7, a larger value of 퐴2 yields a higher equilibrium reserves-to-GDP ratio.
The interpretation is the same as discussed in the previous section. The impulse responses that
correspond to different values of 퐴2 are shown in Figure A.8. A higher level of 퐴2 corresponds to
a smaller increase in reserves and a larger increase in the FDI inflow.
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Figure A.6: IRF for different values of 휁















































































Note: This graph plots the impulse responses for a 10 % FDI technology shock on 퐴푡,2 for
different values of 휁
A.5.3 The elasticity of substitution, 휌
The parameter 휌, which governs the elasticity of substitution between domestic investment and
foreign investment, seems to be an essential parameter for determining the level of foreign invest-
ment and thus the equilibrium level of reserves. However, it has little effect on the equilibrium
level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio.
If I perform a similar exercise that involves holding the other parameters fixed from the baseline
analysis and only varying the level of 휌 from 0 to 0.5, meaning that the elasticity of substitution
ranges from 1 to 2, the equilibrium level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio is always approximately
23%. The equilibrium level of foreign investment as a percentage of total investment decreases as
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Figure A.7: Change in the level of 퐴2














Note: This graph plots the equilibrium level of the reserves-to-GDP ratio for different values of
퐴2
the elasticity of substitution increases. However, the decrease in 푖퐹푡 increases the marginal benefit
of holding one more unit of 푖퐹푡 on the level of technology. Since the cost of holding reserves has
not changed, the central bank would always want to hold reserves at the level that balances the
costs and benefits of doing so. Therefore, we observe that the equilibrium level of reserves is does
not appear to be significantly sensitive to a change in the elasticity of substitution.
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Figure A.8: IRF for different values of 퐴2















































































Note: This graph plots the impulse responses for a 10 % FDI technology shock on 퐴푡,2 for
different values of 퐴2, the steady-state value of 퐴푡,2
128
Appendix B: Appendix to chapter 2
B.1 Summary statistics of data cleaning
Table B.1: Reduction of observations due to lack of asset or number of employees
economy # of obs be-
fore cleaning
# of obs after
cleaning
survival rate # of FDI firms # of domestic
firms
AU 10873 5053 0.464729 1307 3746
AT 13428 7034 0.523831 1612 5422
BE 18526 12683 0.684605 2240 10443
BM 684 280 0.409357 96 184
BA 1552 1202 0.774485 248 954
BR 5290 1374 0.259735 253 1121
BG 5614 3979 0.708764 846 3133
CN 56589 22378 0.395448 5071 17307
HR 2456 2107 0.857899 468 1639
CZ 19719 9586 0.48613 2857 6729
DK 9046 4796 0.530179 1100 3696
EE 1593 937 0.588198 370 567
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
economy # of obs be-
fore cleaning
# of obs after
cleaning
survival rate # of FDI firms # of domestic
firms
FI 7530 4774 0.633997 968 3806
FR 74164 38764 0.522679 5391 33373
DE 116706 69166 0.592652 8673 60493
GR 3769 3490 0.925975 616 2874
HK 5289 401 0.075818 302 99
HU 6756 5140 0.760805 850 4290
IN 18062 1539 0.085207 249 1290
ID 550 524 0.952727 180 344
IE 7682 2472 0.321791 903 1569
IT 70652 54412 0.770141 5163 49249
JP 45313 31328 0.691369 425 30903
KZ 845 695 0.822485 99 596
KR 28835 19751 0.684966 1253 18498
LV 1691 1303 0.77055 498 805
LT 1923 1627 0.846074 468 1159
LU 3636 772 0.212321 341 431
MK 1235 722 0.584615 122 600
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
economy # of obs be-
fore cleaning
# of obs after
cleaning
survival rate # of FDI firms # of domestic
firms
MX 1938 535 0.276058 54 481
MD 614 276 0.449511 33 243
ME 267 182 0.681648 57 125
NL 31084 7492 0.241024 1984 5508
NO 20423 11503 0.563238 1592 9911
PK 567 376 0.663139 64 312
PE 214 146 0.682243 70 76
PL 18590 5461 0.29376 1479 3982
PT 10981 8400 0.764958 1561 6839
RO 9453 7281 0.770232 2463 4818
RU 75713 66875 0.88327 7260 59615
RS 3760 2400 0.638298 523 1877
SK 4614 3574 0.774599 1349 2225
SI 2192 1599 0.729471 405 1194
ES 48148 33921 0.704515 4326 29595
LK 527 172 0.326376 44 128
SE 20405 13321 0.65283 2760 10561
131
Table B.1 – continued from previous page
economy # of obs be-
fore cleaning
# of obs after
cleaning
survival rate # of FDI firms # of domestic
firms
CH 22143 310 0.014 87 223
TW 2169 1544 0.711849 57 1487
TR 4691 165 0.035174 46 119
UA 9242 7805 0.844514 1579 6226
GB 105246 35116 0.333656 8207 26909
B.2 An alternative measure of job creation based on shareholders funds
The main analysis in section 2.4 is based on the number of employees per asset, but there can be
other ways to measure the financial resources used to operate the firm. For example, the same
exercise can be conducted by replacing the total assets with shareholders funds
푒푒푞푢푖푡푦 = 푙표푔10(Number of employeesShareholder’s funds ) (B.1)
One problem of this measure is that often the shareholders funds are negative. This can happen for
example when the firm runs a deficit, but it gets loans from banks guaranteed by its parent company.
We drop the observations with negative shareholders funds and conduct the same exercise as Figure
2.3.
Figure B.1 shows that the qualitative feature of the main analysis remains similar if the total asset
is replaced by shareholders funds. The result can be interpreted as indicating the robustness of the
main analysis, suggesting that domestic firms on average create more jobs than FDI firms for one
of unit of financial resource.
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Figure B.1: Domestic firms create more jobs in most economies for each dollar of equity
A larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that on average domestic firms create more jobs
than FDI firms for each dollar of equity. Red dots correspond to those whose result of the
hypothesis test changed from Figure 2.3
B.3 Alternative definition of FDI firms
The definition of FDI firms in the main analysis of section IV is based on the 10 percent threshold of
foreign shareholders. Although the 10 percent threshold is the internationally accepted definition
of BPM6, one might be concerned about whether the result survives when a different threshold is
chosen.
One natural candidate for the threshold is 50. In BPM6, the shareholders with more than 50
percent share are defined as the investors who can exercise control, while those with 10 percent
share are considered to be able to exercise a significant degree of influence but not control. Thus,
the alternative threshold 50 narrows down the FDI firms to those controlled by foreign shareholders
and extends the set of domestic firms by including those that are not controlled but are under the
influence of foreign shareholders.
Figure B.2 shows that the qualitative result survives even if the definition of FDI firms adopts the
50 percent threshold instead of 10. Thus, the behavior of FDI firms is mostly driven by those
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that are controlled by foreign shareholders with more than 50 percent share. Table B.2 shows the
number of firms by the share held by foreign investors. Indeed, one can see that the majority of
FDI firms are controlled by foreign investors.
Figure B.2: Qualitative result survives if FDI firms are defined using 50 percent threshold
A larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that on average domestic firms create more jobs
than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. Red dots correspond to those whose result of the
hypothesis test changed from Figure 2.3
Table B.2: Number of firms by the share held by nonresident
Share held by foreigners [0,10) [10,50) [50,100]
AU 3746 137 1169
AT 5422 165 1446
BE 10443 153 2087
BM 184 69 27
BA 954 62 186
BR 1121 67 186
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Table B.2 – continued from previous page
Share held by foreigners [0,10) [10,50) [50,100]
BG 3133 113 737
CN 17307 744 4337
HR 1639 55 413
CZ 6729 271 2579
DK 3696 56 1042
EE 567 48 322
FI 3806 64 904
FR 33373 582 4809
DE 60493 1324 7349
GR 2874 156 460
HK 99 50 252
HU 4290 48 802
IN 1290 143 106
ID 344 108 72
IE 1569 79 824
IT 49249 737 4426
JP 30903 256 169
KZ 596 32 66
135
Table B.2 – continued from previous page
Share held by foreigners [0,10) [10,50) [50,100]
KR 18498 333 920
LV 805 77 421
LT 1159 75 393
LU 431 66 275
MK 600 19 103
MX 481 10 40
MD 243 10 23
ME 125 19 38
NL 5508 53 1931
NO 9911 137 1454
PK 312 27 37
PE 76 29 41
PL 3982 292 1187
PT 6839 220 1341
RO 4818 426 2037
RU 59615 1022 6100
RS 1877 70 453
SK 2225 157 1192
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Table B.2 – continued from previous page
Share held by foreigners [0,10) [10,50) [50,100]
SI 1194 53 352
ES 29595 521 3805
LK 128 26 18
SE 10561 226 2534
CH 223 10 78
TW 1487 41 16
TR 119 12 34
UA 6226 415 1164
GB 26909 468 7739
B.4 Alternative definition of SPEs: restrict SPEs to FDI firms
In the main analysis of section 2.4, we have dropped all the SPEs defined as the firms with less
than 5 employees. Although the criteria follow the recommendation of IMF (2018) as discussed
in section 2.3.2, the crude nature of the definition may raise concerns about the robustness of the
main result.
One concern of defining all the firms with less than 5 employees as SPEs is that it might exclude
many domestic firms that are engaged in real economic activities, such as self-employed and small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Thus, this section defines SPEs to be the FDI firms with
less than 5 employees and assume none of the domestic firms are SPEs.
Figure B.3 presents the result. One can see that the inclusion of domestic firms with less than 5
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employees changes results for several economies, but the majority remains the same. One caveat
is that Orbis may not have better coverage for larger firms, so the analysis of self-employment and
SMEs may not be representative.
Figure B.3: The result changes for some but remains similar for most economies if SPEs are
removed from only FDI firms
A larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that on average domestic firms create more jobs
than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. Red dots correspond to those whose result of the
hypothesis test changed from Figure 2.3
B.5 Alternative definition of SPE: lower 5 percentile of the employee distribution
The threshold of 5 employees in the main analysis of section 2.4 might exclude firms dispropor-
tionately from the sets of FDI and domestic firms since the employment distributions of the two
groups might have different shapes. To address this concern, this section defines SPEs to be the
firms in the lower 5 percentile of the employment distributions of the FDI and domestic firms. It
turns out that, as shown in Figure B.4, the result is almost the same as the main analysis in Figure
2.3.
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Figure B.4: The result remains similar for most economies if SPEs are defined as firms in lower 5
percentile of the number of employees
A larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that on average domestic firms create more jobs
than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. Red dots correspond to those whose result of the
hypothesis test changed from Figure 2.3
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B.6 Industry structure and difference in job creation: finance industry
Figure B.5: The size of finance sector does not tell much about difference in job creation
A larger t-statistic suggests that it is more likely that on average domestic firms create more jobs
than FDI firms for each dollar of assets. X-axis denotes the share of finance industry within
domestic firms.
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B.7 Switchers analysis: Russia, Germany, all firms in the sample
Figure B.6: Switchers analysis for Russia
Y-axis denotes the mean of the log employment per asset ratio for the four groups of firms. There
is no obvious change of pattern after the ownership change from 2013 to 2014.
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Figure B.7: Switchers analysis for Germany
Y-axis denotes the mean of the log employment per asset ratio for the four groups of firms. There
is no obvious change of pattern after the ownership change from 2013 to 2014.
Figure B.8: Switchers analysis for all firms in all the countries in the sample
Y-axis denotes the mean of the log employment per asset ratio for the four groups of firms. There
is no obvious change of pattern after the ownership change from 2013 to 2014.
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B.8 Switchers analysis: difference-in-difference
For each pair of (1) control group 1 and experimental group 2 and (2) control group 3 and experi-
mental group 4 as defined in section VI, we run the following regression









where 푒푖푡 is the log employment per asset for firm 푖 at year 푡 , (훽푖, 훽푡) represents the fixed effects
for the firm and year, 푡푟푒푎푡푖 is a dummy variable with 1 if firm 푖 belongs to the experimental group
that switches the ownership.
The interaction of year and the treatment dummy is included to test the pre-treatment parallel trend
of the switcher and the non-switchers. The interaction term for 2013 is omitted so that the year
2013 serves as the baseline. The standard error is clustered at the firm level to allow correlations
within-firm across observations in different years.
The switch of ownership has an effect if 훽2011 and 훽2012 are close to 0 and 훽2014 is not. In this case,
the two groups have a similar trend before the treatment, but after the switch, there is a change
in the employment per asset for the switchers compared to the non-switchers. 훽2015 and 훽2016 tell
whether the effect of the ownership change increases or dies out.
Table B.3 below shows the results of the two regressions. The first one is the comparison between
group 1 and group 2 firms. The second regression is the comparison between group 3 and group
4 firms. The p-values are put in the parentheses. All the coefficients are insignificant, suggesting
that the difference between the two groups is not the consequence of ownership change but rather
an endogenous behavior. The result is also consistent with the aggregate results in Figure 2.10 and
section B.7.
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Table B.3: Difference in difference analysis
Dependent variable: log of employment per asset





















Firm fixed effect Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes
Observations Balanced Panel: n =
206252, T = 6, N = 1237512
Balanced Panel: n =
29354, T = 6, N = 176124
푅2 4.5682e-07 1.474e-06
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